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Abstract
The paper discusses the income inequality changes which have taken place in a few representative 
developing regions during the last 30 years. While inequality rose in the majority of the countries of 
these regions in the 1980s and 1990s, the last decade was characterized by a bifurcation of inequality 
trends. This divergence offers the possibility to contrast the experience of virtuous regions (Latin 
America and parts of East and South-East Asia) and non-virtuous regions (the European economies 
in transition and China) so as to draw useful lessons. Since the global economic conditions affecting 
inequality in these countries were not too dissimilar and since no major variations in endogenous 
factors were evident across the regions analysed, the difference in inequality trends between 
virtuous and non-virtuous regions was most likely due to institutional factors and public policies. 
An econometric test confirms that the reduction of inequality is possible even under open economy 
conditions if a given set of appropriate macroeconomic, labour, fiscal and social policies is adopted 
by governments.
i. intRoDuction
After a long period of neglect, the last two decades have witnessed a revival of theoretical and empirical 
analyses on income inequality, of its determinants and of its effects on economic development. Several 
factors explain this renewed interest including a perceptible and widespread deterioration of income 
distribution (once considered by many an immutable feature of any economy) during the 1980s and 
1990s, increased data availability and important theoretical advances. Other factors which stimulated 
the analysis of inequality changes were the desire to assess the distributive impact of the ITC revolution 
and domestic and external liberalization which dominated the policy scene since the early 1980s. Last 
but not least, a number of new analyses focused on the distributive impact of the spread of democracy in 
numerous developing countries during the last two decades. Thus, while the analyses of the 1950s, 1960s 
and 1970s focused on the structural determinants of inequality such as land concentration, inequality 
in education and the urban bias of public policy, the new literature – including this study – pays greater 
attention to the impact of technological, policy and political economy factors.
Table 1 summarizes the trends in the Gini coefficients of the within-country distribution of household 
income per capita during the 1980s and 1990s (a period characterized by the spread of neo-liberal policies 
and a string of financial, banking and currency crises) and over the 2000s, a period dominated by an 
improvement in the global economic environment and the adoption of pragmatic macroeconomic and 
social policies in several developing regions. Table 1 shows that the 1980s and 1990s were characterized 
2by a dominance of increases in within-country income inequality in all regions but Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA), while over 2000–2010 there was a bifurcation in inequality trends. On the one side, 
there was a marked and unanticipated decline in income inequality in practically all Latin America (LA) 
and in parts of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and South-East Asia (SEA). On the other, inequality continued 
its upward trend – if at a lower pace – in the majority of the countries of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), in the European and Asian transition economies, in South Asia 
(SA) and in MENA. A closer examination of the time trends in within-country income inequality shows 
that the year of inflection of the Gini trend varied somewhat as a result of region-specific circumstances. 
In particular, the majority of countries of the SA and Asian economies in transition (Cambodia, China, and 
Viet Nam) experienced a steady inequality rise in both sub-periods. In contrast, after rapid surge between 
1990 and 1998 (the years of the transformational recession and economic liberalization), the countries of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (EE-FSU) recorded an average modest decline in the Gini 
coefficient during the years 1998–2003 during which macroeconomic balance was reinstituted and gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth recovered. This decline, however, was followed in the subsequent years 
by a further income polarization. In turn, in SSA income inequality started falling in the majority of the 
21 countries with sufficient data (out of a total of 44 countries) since 1995, while in LA the inequality 
decline began in 2002–2003 following the end of the 2001 dotcom and Argentinean crises of 2001–2002, 
both of which affected the entire region. Finally, the MENA region shows no major changes in inequality 
trends.
Table 1
Trends in the Gini coefficient of the distribution of household disposable income per capita in 
developed, developing and transition economies,a 1980–2000 and 2000–2010b
OECD
European 
transition 
economies
Asian 
transition 
economies
Latin 
America MENA
South-
East Asia
South 
Asia
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa World
1980s (or earlier available year) and 1990s
Specific period for each regionc
1980–
2001
1990–
1998
1980–
2000
1980–
2002
1980–
2000
1980–
1995
1980–
2000
1980–
1995
Rising inequality 14 24 2 14 2 5 3 9 73 (69%)
No change 1 0 1 1 3 0 0 2 8 (8%)
Falling inequality 6 0 0 3 3 2 2 8 24 (23%)
Total 21 24 3 18 8 7 5 19 105 (100%)
 2000–2010 (or similar period)
Specific period for each regionc 
2000–
2010
1998–
2010
2000–
2009
2002–
2010
2000–
2007
1995–
2009
2000–
2010
1995–
2007
Rising inequality 9 13 2 2 4 3 4 7 44 (41%)
No change 4 5 1 1 0 0 1 1 13 (12%)
Falling inequality 8 6 0 15 4 4 0 13 50 (47%)
Total 21 24 3 18 8 7 5 21 107 (100%)
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on SWIIDv3_0, IDLA database, EUROSTAT, World Development Indicators (WDI), African 
Development Bank database (AfDB), Asian Development Bank database (ADB), Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and Pacific (ESCAP) database and national sources.
a The countries/economies included in the analysis are reported in annex table A.1.
b Economies have been assigned to the rising inequality, no change or falling inequality categories on the basis of an 
analysis of time trends and of the difference between the initial and final Gini coefficients for each of the two sub-periods 
considered, i.e. 1980–2000 (top panel) and 2000–2010 (bottom panel).
c The trend analysis shows that the periodization in two periods (1980–2000 versus 2000–2010) varies somewhat from 
region to region. The above data reflect therefore specific regional turning points.
3ii. the wiDespReaD Rise of income inequality DuRing the 1980s anD 1990s
During the 1980s and 1990s (though – as noted – the trend inflection differed somewhat from region to 
region) inequality rose in 73 of the 105 countries with adequate statistical information, that is with at least 
ten well spaced Gini data points, while it fell in only 24 (table 1). What factors explain this widespread 
deterioration in income inequality? Barring in most cases an aggravation of the structural causes of 
inequality (high land and human capital concentration, curse of natural resources and urban policy bias), 
the three sets of causes most frequently mentioned in the literature and briefly reviewed hereafter are:
(i) The Skill Biased Technical Change (SBTC) hypothesis: according to this hypothesis, the technological 
upgrading (in ITC and other advanced sectors) induced by the trade liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s 
raised the demand for skilled workers (who are complementary in production to the new technologies), 
while their supply did not increase because of insufficient public expenditure on secondary and tertiary 
education and due to the inability of poor students to finance their studies. These factors led to a rise 
in the wages of skilled workers while those of unskilled workers declined. While there is widespread 
evidence that the ratio of skilled/unskilled wages rose during the 1980s–1990s, it is not obvious whether 
the technological upgrading was the sole or even the main driver of the observed rise in the skill premium 
and in income inequality. Indeed, while trade liberalization eased the importation of labour-saving, skill-
biased capital goods, the depressed investment climate prevailing in several developing countries during 
the 1980s and 1990s likely hampered the spread of these new technologies. Econometric evidence for 
Latin America (Cornia, 2012) suggests that other factors (such as the spread of informal employment, 
reduced scope of collective bargaining and a fall in minimum wages following the labour market reforms 
of the 1970s–1980s) also played an important role in the inequality increase during that period.
(ii) Increased South-North exports and migration: such literature emphasizes that the rapid growth of the 
effective world labour supply,1 growing global integration of labour markets and subsequent increase in 
South-North migration and the rise in exports of goods with high content of unskilled labour depressed 
the wage rate in both the countries of origin and destination, i.e. in high and middle income countries. In 
addition, migration raised inequality in the countries where the unskilled poor were less likely to migrate 
than mid-income workers better able to finance the high costs of informal migration (between US$ 3,000 
and US$ 20,000 per person). Remittances therefore accrued to households in the 40th to 80th percentile of 
the income distribution, bypassing the people of the lowest rung. At the same time, migration of skilled 
workers may have raised their wage at home, leading to a jump in the wage premium and overall inequality 
in the countries of origin. However, the evidence in this regard is less than conclusive. Docquier and 
Rapoport (2003) for instance argue that migration may be equalizing in source countries if it is state-
sponsored or if large migrant networks in the countries of destination reduce the cost of migration.
(iii) The often premature and unfettered adoption on a grand scale of policies of domestic and external 
liberalization: the literature argues that – contrary to the predictions of the Herkscher-Ohlin theorem – 
trade liberalization was un-equalizing in most cases, especially in the 1980s when tariff rates were slashed 
sharply. While the evidence about the impact of trade liberalization over the 1970s and part of the 1980s 
has been fairly equally divided between studies suggesting an improvement of income inequality or its 
deterioration, a fairly recent empirical review for Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Hong Kong 
(China), the Russian Federation and India covering the 1980s and 1990s (Koujanou-Goldberg and Pavcnik, 
2007) identifies a generalized increase in income inequality during the years of fast trade integration, 
owing to problems of factors immobility from the declining import-competing sector to the new export 
sector; the erosion of comparative advantages vis-à-vis the OECD of the middle income countries (Latin 
America, Eastern Europe, South-East Asia) in the labour-intensive sector due to the entry on the world 
1 Between 1980 and 2005, the effective global labour supply increased almost four-fold with most of this growth 
occurring since 1990 (IMF, 2007: 162). East Asia contributed half of this increase because of a large rise in the working 
age population and greater trade openness.
4market of the low-wage Asian exporters; the unequal distribution of the abundant factor (i.e. in the case 
of land or mineral–intensive exports in countries dominated by latifundia and large mining corporations); 
the import of skill-intensive investment goods mentioned above; and the appreciation of the real exchange 
rate and shift in demand towards cheap imports and away from domestic products when trade and 
finance were liberalized at the same time (Taylor, 2004). Similar distributive effects were observed in 
most cases on occasion of the liberalization of the FDI which were – in contrast – expected ex-ante to 
improve labour absorption and reduce inequality in labour-abundant developing countries (Te Velde and 
Morrissey, 2002). This discrepancy between theoretical expectations and empirical evidence is largely 
explained by the increasing (till about two thirds) of the share of FDIs currently allocated to capital and 
skill-intensive mining, manufacturing (chemicals, metallurgy and machinery), finance, telecommunications 
and business services (UNCTAD, 2009, table A.I.9); the increasing share of FDI which take the form of 
Mergers and Acquisitions which generally shed labour and have adverse short term distributive effects 
(Baldwin, 1995; Morley, 2000); and by the entry of capital-intensive FDI in markets which were supplied 
by labour-intensive domestic firms (as in the case of supermarkets which “stole the business” of numerous 
and less efficient small-shops). Even stronger evidence concerns the distributive impact of the capital 
account liberalization, which has almost been found to be strongly un-equalizing (Galbraith and Lu, 1999; 
Diwan, 1999; Behrman et al., 2000) due to the appreciation and/or instability of the real exchange rate, 
the allocation of such flows to capital and skill-intensive firms in the FIRE (finance, insurance, and real 
estate) sectors; their volatility which can lead to destabilizing financial crises; and the negative effects of 
deregulated financial systems owing to problems of incomplete information, markets and contracts, herd 
behaviour, panics, weak supervision and assets price speculation (Prasad et al., 2003).
The impact of domestic neo-liberal reforms was possibly more nuanced. Financial de-repression was found 
to be highly un-equalizing owing to: the attraction of destabilizing foreign capitals whenever it was carried 
out in the presence of large budget deficits; the failure to create competition among liberalized banks 
and weak regulatory capacity of the newly liberalized banks which led to instability and banking crises. 
The liberalization of wage formation had mixed effects (depending on whether the employment-creation 
effect prevailed over the wage-compression effect), the institutional changes in the labour market (e.g. a 
drop in minimum wages) a negative effect, the liberal tax reform reduced the tax/GDP ratio and did not 
improve tax incidence. Finally, the impact of privatization varied according to the approach followed: 
the egalitarian redistribution of land, housing, small business and State-owned enterprises (SOEs) shares 
observed in some transitional economies generated favourable effects (as in the case of the distribution of 
the Communes’ land in China and state factories in the Czech Republic), while the insider privatization 
of the Russian Federation was highly un-equalizing.
5iii. inequality tRenDs anD theiR DeteRminants in selecteD Regions 
DuRing the last DecaDe
As noted in section I, the last decade was characterized until 2008 by a fairly general return to growth – 
including in regions (such as SSA, LA, EE-FSU) which had been affected by the debt crisis of the 1980s, 
the instability caused by the liberalization of the 1990s and, in the case of EE-FSU, by an extremely severe 
transformational recession. As noted in section I, the last decade was characterized by: (i) a slow down 
in the intensity and frequency of inequality rises, possibly due to the petering out of the dis-equalizing 
effect of the liberal reforms of the 1980s and 1990s; and (ii) a bifurcation of inequality trends among 
regions (table 1): while Latin America, as well as South-East Asia (and sub-Saharan Africa)2 (figure 1) 
experienced a reversal in past trends, all other regions continued exhibiting rises in inequality both on 
average and in the majority of the countries of each region (table 1 and figure 2). The most dramatic 
case of inequality decline is that of Latin America, as between 2002 and 2010 the average regional Gini 
decline by 5.5 points, while Argentina (9 points), Brazil and Peru (7 points) and the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela (6.3 points) recorded much larger declines.
This trend bifurcation raises a number of questions. Indeed, while practically all developing and 
transitional regions were affected during the last decade by a rapid expansion of world trade, gains in 
terms of trade for some countries, easier access to global finance, rising migrant remittances, and so on, 
only some countries experienced a drop in income dispersion. In a sense, this trend bifurcation represents 
a kind of ‘natural experiment’ helping to disentangle the sources of the inequality decline in the virtuous 
regions and of the increase in the others. In fact, as the structural and exogenous conditions were not 
too dissimilar, the regional divergence in inequality trends might then be due to differences in domestic 
policies. With the possible exception of the OECD and SSA, most developing and transitional regions 
are in fact ‘similarly heterogeneous’: most of them benefited from either high commodity prices, or rising 
remittances, financial exuberance and rapid world growth. Nor, does the inequality bifurcation of the last 
decade seem to be driven by growth differentials. Indeed, all fast growing Asian countries (e.g. China, 
2  Since the mid-late 1990s, several sub-Saharan countries recorded improvements in the field of income inequality, 
growth and democracy (Radelet, 2010; Gualdani, 2012). According to both the Polity IV and Freedom House index, the 
number of democracies rose from three (Botswana, Mauritius and Namibia) in the early 1990s to 20 (out of 44 countries) 
in 2008. In turn, growth of GDP per capita – negative over 1980–1995 in two thirds of the countries of the region – turned 
positive in nearly 80 per cent of them over 1995–2010. And during this period, the distribution of income improved in 
13 of the 21 countries with reliable information. While these gains concern on average less than half of the countries of the 
region (17 according to Radelet, 2010) they are nevertheless encouraging. No doubt, the achievement of macroeconomic 
stabilization in the mid-late 1990s and the end of the foreign debt crisis helped reduced volatility (Kayizzi Mugerva, 2000). 
Yet, the gains of the 2000s are highly heterogeneous, were often due to exogenous factors (rather than to the implementation 
of new policies) and may not be sustainable over the long term. The main source of the recent growth and decline in 
inequality is an exogenous improvement of the global economic environment, in particular: (i) a rise of the international 
demand and prices of the commodities exported by the region, such as oil, copper and other metals, diamonds, rare earths, 
timber and so on; (ii) greater Chinese foreign direct investments (FDIs) in the primary and infrastructural sector (as in 
Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Zambia and, especially, South Africa); (iii) slowly rising tourist receipts (as in 
Cape Verde and Rwanda) and a small rise in migrant remittances; and (iv) large increases in aid (as in the United Republic 
of Tanzania). More sustainably, growth intensified also because of the spontaneous diffusion of new technologies (such 
as cell phones) or because of the policy-driven diversification of the economy (as in Mauritius and Uganda) and better 
technology policies and incentives to farmers (as in Malawi and Mozambique) which helped the recovery of agriculture 
in about half of the region. Overall, after many years of decline, agriculture and food production per capita have grown 
at low but positive rates until 2008, in most cases leading to an equalizing increase in food production per capita. Thus, 
the sources of the welcome gains recorded in part of the region seem very heterogeneous, mostly exogenous and may not 
be sustainable over the very long term (as in the case of the increase in commodity prices). Some of these growth drivers 
may also exacerbates the previous neo-colonial pattern of international division of labour which was assigned to Africa 
the role of commodity exporter. Meanwhile, some of the traditional problems (limited or even declining industrialization, 
poor governance, slow growth and political instability) still grip more than half of the continent. Thus, while there are 
glimmers of hope that a new economic policy model may emerge in the future in sub-Saharan Africa, this does not seem 
to have morphed yet on a clear and broad enough scale.
6Figure 1
Trends in the Gini index of the distribution of disposable per capita income in 18 Latin 
American countries for 1980–2010 and of four South-East Asian countries for 1980–2008
Source: Martorano and Cornia, 2012.
Note: Latin America and the Caribbean comprises: Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). South-East Asia comprises: Malaysia, the Philippines, the Republic of 
Korea and Thailand.
Figure 2
Trends in the average Gini index of the distribution of income per capita of 21 transition 
economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and China, 1980–2009
Source: Martorano and Cornia, 2012.
Note: Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union comprises: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, the 
Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine 
and Uzbekistan. The data for EE-FSU for the years 1984–1991 cover only between 14 and 22 countries with data on the 
distribution of wages, while those for 2006–2009 refer only to 17 to 23 countries with data on the distribution of income. 
Both periods are not strictly comparable with those for the years 1992–2005.
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7India and Viet Nam) experienced a sharp rise in inequality during this period. Other (mostly policy) 
factors discussed in sections III.A to III.D are thus likely to explain the better performance of LA and 
countries of SEA in relation to those of the EE-FSU and China. By comparing the experience of virtuous 
and non-virtuous regions one may thus learn important policy lessons on how can inequality be reduced 
under the current economy conditions.
A. Declining inequality and Latin America’s new policy model of the 2000s
As already noted, during the last decade, Latin America experienced a nearly universal drop in income 
inequality. According to an expanding body of literature (Lopez Calva and Lustig, 2010; Cornia, 2012) 
the factors which could explain such unexpected phenomenon include: the partial or general equilibrium 
effect of the improvement in external conditions (terms of trade, remittances, access to foreign finance); 
the acceleration of GDP growth made possible by the relaxation of the balance of payments constraint 
due to the above factors and to domestic policy changes; endogenous changes in dependency ratios and 
activity rates; the lagged effect of growing public expenditure on education during the 1990s and 2000s; 
and the adoption of a new policy model – which we name ‘open economy growth with equity’ – by a 
growing number of left-of-centre government and, in part, by more conservative political coalitions.
Such literature (and the related econometric evidence) suggests that the partial equilibrium effects of the 
improvements in the global economic environment were either un-equalizing or not sufficiently general 
to cause an improvement in inequality (see below). Indeed, the improvement in international commodity 
prices benefited 8 countries out of 18 and occurred in a context of a high ownership concentration of land 
and mines i.e. sectors where production is very large, skilled-labour and capital intensive. Nevertheless, 
in a few countries the increase in commodity rents raised government revenue and so allowed to augment 
progressive public subsidies. Likewise, as argued above, the direct effect of an increase in remittances in 
seven countries likely benefited the middle-class people, though there is evidence that remittances were 
equalizing in the case of Mexico and El Salvador (Acevedo and Cabrera, 2012). In turn, the remarkable 
inflow of foreign capital at declining interest rates of 2004–2007 mainly benefited large, capital and skills-
intensive companies and banks and did not ease the problems of access to credit by labour-intensive, 
small-medium size enterprises, while causing a dis-equalizing appreciation of the real exchange rate in 
most countries (Ocampo, 2009). All in all, the partial equilibrium effects of the improvement in external 
conditions is unlikely to explain, with a few exceptions (i.e. some of the countries where such phenomena 
were very pronounced), the recent decline of inequality. However, there is evidence that the general 
equilibrium effects of the boom in terms of trade, remittances and capital inflows relaxed the balance of 
payments constrain to growth (Thirlwall, 2011) and raised the rate of growth of GDP and, through that, 
of employment and revenue collection. As the new jobs were mainly taken by low-income workers, there 
was a downward pressure on the decline of wage inequality.
Third, inequality might have declined due to an endogenous decline in dependency rates (which concerned 
mainly low income household) and increase in activity rates. Yet, dependency rates had fallen also in the 
1980s and 1990s i.e. years during which inequality rose. Also, the econometric evidence suggests that 
their impact was non-significant (Cornia, 2012) or modest (Lopez Calva and Lustig, 2010). Likewise, 
case studies for Argentina, Brazil and Mexico show that the increase in activity rates had only a very 
small equalizing effect on income inequality, while the opposite was true in Peru (ibid.). Fourth, the 
redistribution of the human capital stock among households following the rise in secondary enrolment 
rates (particularly among the poor) recorded since the early 1990s (Cruces et al., 2011) led to an 
improvement in the distribution of human capital among workers and a widespread and pronounced drop 
in the skill-premium and income inequality. Last but not less important, the econometric evidence shows 
that the inequality decline was also in part explained by policy changes which followed the return to 
and consolidation of democracy and the election of left-of-centre (LOC) regimes caused by the growing 
frustration with the disappointing results of the neo-liberal policies implemented during the 1980s and 
1990s (Latinobarometro, various years). By mid-2011, of the 18 Latin American countries analysed, 
813 were ruled by LOC regimes which assigned greater importance than their predecessors to matters of 
social justice while at the same time, retaining a prudent approach to macroeconomics.
The policies introduced by the LOC regimes pivot around an orthodox fiscal and monetary stance 
emphasizing low inflation and a long term budget equilibrium. There are however considerable elements of 
novelty in the field of macroeconomics as well, including in terms of the adoption of: (a) a countercyclical 
(or a-cyclical) fiscal policy (which led over 2006–2007 to a zero average fiscal deficit for the region as a 
whole); (b) the achievement of fiscal balance through an increase in tax revenue rather than expenditure 
cuts. Indeed, tax revenue rose during the last decade by three points of GDP for the region as a whole, 
with much larger increases recorded in Brazil and Argentina and smaller ones in Central America. The 
increase in the tax/GDP ratio was achieved by raising the taxation of commodity rents in the seven key 
commodity exporters, broadening progressive taxation (including income tax) and reducing regressive 
taxation.3 As a result, the Reynolds-Smolensky index – which measures the redistributive effect of taxation 
– improved in 11 of the 12 countries with available data (Cornia, Gomez Sabaini and Martorano, 2011); 
(c) a countercyclical monetary policy aiming at controlling money supply during periods of bonanza 
through the accumulation of reserves, sterilization and (in the case of Argentina, Colombia and Brazil) 
the introduction of some capital controls while reducing sharply the monetary policy rate and expanding 
public lending in the crisis years; (d) the near universal abandonment (with the exception of fixed-peg 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and dollarized Ecuador, El Salvador and Panama) of the free floats 
and fixed peg regimes introduced during the 1980s and 1990s and the adoption of a managed exchange 
rate aiming at limiting its real appreciation. The goal was to shift economic activity towards the labour-
intensive traded sector (e.g. manufacturing and agriculture) with favourable effects on income distribution, 
exports and growth. To support this policy, a few countries introduced temporary capital controls and 
allowed Central Banks to intervene in the currency market. Despite these measures, the management of 
the real exchange rate remains a problem, as fourteen countries recorded between 2003 and 2010 a real 
appreciation (CEPAL, 2010) which in five exceeded 10 per cent. Yet, without an accumulation of reserves 
and sterilization efforts, several countries would have shown stronger symptoms of Dutch disease and 
accelerating asset price inflation with negative effects on income inequality; (e) the free trade policies 
adopted since 1980s – which had led to a shift in resource allocation against unskilled-labour intensive 
sectors – were not overturned, in part because the newly adopted exchange rate regimes offered some 
protection to the tradable sector. However, there was a substantial reorientation of trade destinations 
favouring the intra-regional trade (including in manufacturing products) and trade with the Asian 
countries (mainly for primary commodities). Conscious of the risks of ‘re-primarization’ involved in the 
intensification of trade with Asia, tariff rates have been increased in 2011 in part of the region (Brazil and 
Argentina ahead of all) while the use of non-tariff barriers seems to be intensifying; and (f) finally, there 
was a reduction of foreign public debt – which had been a major source of economic instability – through 
advanced reimbursements, defaults and cancellations, while currency reserves increased sharply. As a 
result, LA’s gross foreign debt declined from 40 per cent of the regional GDP in 2002 to 17.4 per cent in 
2008 and 20.4 in 2009, while the debt net of foreign reserves fell even more (figure 3).
The new LOC policy model introduced also perceptible changes in the labour market and social policies, 
including: (a) labour policies explicitly addressing the problems inherited from the prior two decades, 
i.e. unemployment, job informalization, falling minimum wages, diminishing coverage of social security 
and weakening of institutions for wage negotiations. In this respect, a few countries enacted income 
policies consisting in public works, extending the coverage of formal employment, re-introducing 
tripartite wage bargaining and sizeable hikes in minimum wages (but less so in average wages) which 
appear to have generated equalizing effects; (b) a near universal acceleration in the upward trend in 
public social expenditure on social security, social assistance and education made possible by the rise 
in tax/GDP ratios mentioned above and in a few cases by the cancellation of debt servicing obligations 
3 An emblematic example is the 2007 Uruguayan tax reform which made an explicit effort at improving the equity of 
taxation via the introduction of dual tax regime (Martorano, 2012).
9which generated short and long term redistributive 
effects as suggested by table 2. There is evidence 
also that democratization and the abandonment of 
clientelistic policies improved the incidence of social 
expenditure (Lopez Calva and Lustig, 2010); (c) the 
nearly universal introduction of highly targeted 
social assistance conditional and non-conditional 
cash transfers which generated a sizeable impact on 
income inequality (Cornia, 2012). Such programmes 
are funded by the budget (rather than foreign aid), 
absorb 0.2–0.8 of GDP and cover an important share 
of the population at risk with the aim of reducing 
poverty and child labour, ensuring that children 
remain in school and have access to health services 
and that the jobless can get employed or enter a 
training scheme.
As a result, between 2003 and 2010, the fall of 
inequality entirely offset its increase recorded during 
the 1980s and 1990s. However, it is unclear whether 
this inequality decline can be sustained in the future, 
unless specific measures are introduced to address 
the structural causes of inequality in the region. In 
this respect, with the exception of the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela and the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia, few measures were introduced so far 
to broaden access of the poor to land, industrial 
assets, tertiary education and credit, to reduce ethnic 
segregation and reduce overdependence on primary 
commodities and foreign capitals. In particular, 
the new LA development model has, on average, 
progressed less in promoting the spread of manufacturing and reducing the dependence on foreign savings 
and technology. In the absence of a clear industrial policy – which some argue may be emerging in the 
form of non-tariff barriers, as observed very recently in some countries – there are mounting concerns 
about the ‘re-primarization’ of the economy.
Figure 3
Net foreign asset position in Latin America 
and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, 2000–2010
(Per cent of GDP)
Source: Authors’ compilation, based on data extracted from 
World Development Indicators.
Note: Latin America comprises: Argentina, Bolivia (Pluri-
national State of), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivar-
ian Republic of). Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union comprises: Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Republic of Moldova, 
Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slo-
venia, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
Table 2
Incidence of government expenditure and concentration coefficients by quintile over 1997–2004
(Panel a) 
Shares of public social expenditure
by sector and income quintile
Expenditure
sector
(Panel b) 
Concentration coefficients of public 
social expenditure 
I quintile II quintile III quintile IV quintile V quintile Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
7.4 6.5 6.3 5.9 5.6 Education -0.067 0.116 -0.138
5.1 4.7 4.2 4.0 3.7 Health 0.074 -0.073 -0.192
2.0 2.8 4.3 6.3 16.5 Social security 0.504 0.568 0.349
3.3 2.1 1.6 1.3 1.1 Social assist. -0.089 -0.154 -0.484
0.8 0.9 1.1 1.4 0.9 Housing 0.206 0.067 -0.026
19.6 17.0 17.5 18.9 27.8 Total 0.143 0.042 0.044
Source: Elaboration on CEPAL, 2007.
Note: Group 1 includes: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay 
and Peru. Group 2 includes: Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). 
Group 3 includes: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay.
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B. Renewed ‘growth with equity’ in South-East Asia during the last fifteen years 
The ‘growth with equity’ or ‘East-Asian Miracle’ (World Bank, 1993) have for long been considered the 
most successful development strategy ever adopted. Nonetheless, such approach started loosing strength 
in the mid-1980s (as growth continued but inequality rose also in several countries of the region, see 
table 1) and collapsed during the 1997–1998 Asian crisis. Already prior to the Asian crisis, several countries 
experienced un-equalizing structural transformations: for instance, the acceleration of technological change 
pushed up the skill premium in countries with a limited publicly funded supply of skilled workers. In 
addition, economic liberalization reduced the scope for redistributive policies. However, not all countries 
of the region experienced a rise in inequality post-1997. Indeed, since peaking in 1999, the Gini coefficient 
dropped in Malaysia, Thailand and the Republic of Korea (table 3), the countries analysed in this section, 
as well as in the Philippines, while it rose in Indonesia, Taiwan Province of China and Singapore.
The decline of inequality in these three countries 
is not due to a single set of factors. Unlike in other 
developing regions, the changes in dependency rates 
were comparatively small (with the exception of 
Thailand) as the demographic transition occurred 
earlier. Indeed, while the regional dependency ratio 
rate fell from 70.8 to 53.6 between 1980 and 1997, 
it then dropped only from 52.9 to 47.0 between 1998 
and 2010, making it unlikely that the inequality trend 
observed during the later period was driven by a 
large decline in dependency rates among the poor. 
The same applies to activity rates which rose from 
65.4 in 1980 to 66.2 in 1997 to slight decline to 65.5 
in 2010. As for terms of trade effects, these appear 
to have been limited or negative and cannot therefore account for the decline of income inequality in 
these countries. 
In contrast, a few common policy factors help explain the distributive gains recorded in these countries in 
the post 1997-era. These include a pragmatic macroeconomic policy which assured stability and boosted 
growth (especially in Malaysia4 and Thailand); large investments in public education which raised the 
number of years of schooling of the labour force and improved the distribution of human capital among 
the workers, thus allowing to take advantages of new technical advances while avoiding a further rise of 
the wage skill premium; and a strengthening of redistributive policies focused on social protection (of 
the Republic of Korea), the reduction of the rural-urban gap (in Thailand), or the narrowing of income 
differentials among ethnic groups (in Malaysia).
(a) A pragmatic macroeconomic policy: after the Asian crisis of 1997, the three EA economies analysed 
adopted prudent macroeconomic policies which led to low inflation and the consolidation of a sound fiscal 
position. Positive fiscal balances were recorded by the Republic of Korea and Thailand and only a small 
deficit by Malaysia. The government expenditure remained relatively small and almost was exclusively 
financed with domestic revenue (ADB’s Statistical Database System online). A peculiarity of these three 
countries is the large contribution of direct taxes to total tax revenue, a fact which helped improved the 
post-tax distribution of income. In turn, trade policy remained open, as signalled by broadly constant or 
declining tariff rates practiced for the most favoured nation between 1995 and 2010 (stagnant at 7 per 
cent in the Republic of Korea and falling from 10 to seven per cent in Malaysia, and from 20.6 to 9.5 in 
4 The Malaysian macroeconomic policy has historically been growth-driven. As noted by Wee and Jomo (2006: 194), 
“Malaysian macroeconomic policy has been summarized as ‘optimizing growth subject to restraint on prices and the 
balance of payments.” The Government increased public investment in a way complementary to market forces.
Table 3
Trend in Gini coefficient for three Asian 
countries from 1970s to late 2000s
Rep. of Korea Malaysia Thailand
1970s 36.1 51.4 45.8
Early 1980s 35.1 47.2 46.1
1990 28.2 45.9 50.2
1998 29.0 46.1 48.2
1999 29.7 45.2 48.0
Late 2000s 28.3 44.1 40.0
Source: Martorano and Cornia, 2012; Milanovic, 2005; Jomo, 
2006; and Ragayah, 2011.
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Thailand). Export growth was sustained by means of 
a stable and competitive real exchange rate. Thailand 
adopted de facto a managed float, while Malaysia 
first turned to a fixed exchange regime and shifted 
to a managed float in 2006. In both cases, after the 
large devaluations of 1997–1998, the real effective 
exchange rate (REER) remained broadly stable 
including after the post 2008–2009 crisis (figure 4).
Unlike Malaysia, the Republic of Korea and Thailand 
introduced policies to attract green-field FDI by 
means of tax, export and reinvestment incentives. 
However, to reduce the pressure on the real exchange 
rate they introduced controls on portfolio flows (in 
1994 on inflows and 1998 on outflows in the case of 
Malaysia; in 2006 in Thailand). Indeed, the Kaopen 
index – which measures the openness of their capital 
account – declined in the case of Malaysia and 
stagnated at a partially opened level in the Republic 
of Korea and Thailand (table 4).
(b) High investments in education: although the East-Asian countries historically assigned to education 
public resources in line to those of other developing countries, they achieved more favourable results in 
this area due to the ways in which such spending was allocated. This assured a high level of educational 
quality for all, in particular in the field of scientific education (Zhang, 2008). Indeed, a rapid expansion of 
secondary and tertiary education not only during the 1980s and 1990s but also the recent decade enhanced 
the possibility of profiting of rapid technical progress in the ITC and other sectors while at the same time 
avoiding an increase in the wage skill premium and in overall inequality, as the higher demand for skilled 
labour was matched by an increase in its supply. The clearest example of this policy is provided by the 
Republic of Korea which in the late 1990s switched to knowledge-intensive, high-tech productions without 
experiencing an increase in the skill premium which remained stable at 3.5 during the 2000s (figure 5).
Malaysia too invested heavily in education. In particular, two specific strategies were followed: first, 
improving access to post–primary education and second, promoting the creation of employment 
opportunities (Ragayah, 2011). As a result, the average years of education of the workforce steadily 
increased from 8.2 in 2000 to 9.5 in 2010 with faster than average increases recorded among the poor 
(ibid.). Less pronounced, but of similar nature were the gains observed in Thailand where the share of 
workers with secondary education rose substantially since the mid-1990s, while the number of those 
with tertiary education increased since 2000. The resulting decrease in inequality in education promoted 
a reduction of wage inequality (di Gropello and Sakellariou, 2010; Kwack, 2010 and Ragayah, 2011).
Figure 4
Real effective exchange rate over  
the period 1994–2012
Source: BIS real effective exchange rate indices.
Note: 2000 = 100.
Table 4
Kaopen index of capital account openness, selected economies over 1980–2009
Indonesia Philippines Singapore
China, Hong 
Kong SAR
Republic 
of Korea Malaysia Thailand
1980–1989 2.23 -1.04 2.40 2.48 -0.73 2.23 -0.10
1990–1997 2.38 -0.08 2.35 2.48 -0.36 1.60 -0.10
1998–2009 1.16 0.10 2.39 2.48 -0.21 0.07 -0.27
Source: Chinn and Ito, 2011.
Note: The Kaopen index is a positive function of the openness. The index has a zero mean.
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(c) Labour market and social policies: Social 
objectives have traditionally been an integral part of 
the Malaysian development strategy and constituted 
an important chapter of the National Development 
Policy (NDP) (1991–2000) and the National Vision 
Policy (NVP) (2001–2010). “While …. NDP 
and NVP have different tag lines and some slight 
variations in approaches and emphasis, in the main 
the policies and strategies for poverty eradication and 
income distribution remain pretty much the same, 
being pursued along the ethnic lines” (Ragayah, 
2011: 2).
To achieve these objectives, the government favoured 
the creation of a Malay middle class by promoting 
their acquisitions of assets and well-paid jobs, 
financial and management training for firms run 
by Bumiputeras, fixed enrolment quotas in tertiary 
education and support for the poorest household’s 
activities (ibid.). In turn, the regional development strategy tried to balance growth between regions, control 
migration towards urban areas and promote agricultural development. In all this, the state investments 
in infrastructure (transport, water and electricity, health and education) were of paramount importance. 
As a result, vertical inequality decreased, the rural-urban income gap remained broadly unchanged while 
household income disparity between Chinese, Bumiputera and Indians fell steadily (table 5).
Traditionally, the three economies analysed have 
been characterized by comparatively weak labour 
market policies, a low level of unionization (the 
Republic of Korea is an exception) and limited 
social provisions against joblessness. Due to the near 
full-employment conditions prevailing in the 1980s 
and 1990s, the creation of a welfare system – and in 
particular of unemployment insurance and labour 
market institutions – was considered unnecessary in 
much of the region. As a result, these countries lacked 
the labour market and social assistance institutions to 
prevent a sharp rise in unemployment and inequality 
in the aftermath of the 1997–1998 financial crisis.
For instance, in the Republic of Korea, the unemployment rate rose from 2 per cent in 1996 to 7 per cent in 
1998 (Yamamura et al., 2008), while the share of employed workers with part time or temporary contracts 
rose sharply and the Gini coefficient grew from 27.3 in 1996 to 29.7 in 1999. To respond to this crisis, the 
government strengthened substantially the coverage and benefits of the Employment Insurance Programme, 
with the result the percentage of unemployed receiving the unemployment benefits rose steadily from 
only 7.8 per cent in 1997 to 33 per cent in 1999 (Known et al., 2010). In 1999, the government introduced 
the Minimum Living Standard Guarantee which provides benefits to poor people, conditionally to their 
participation to training, public work projects, or community service (Kwon, 2005). In addition, the 
social protection system was built on “five social insurance programmes (Industrial Accident Insurance, 
National Health Insurance, National Pension Programme, Employment Insurance Programme and Long-
Term Care Insurance), one social assistance programme (the Minimum Living Standard Guarantee) and 
public pension programmes for special categories” (Kwon et al., 2010: 8).
Figure 5
Wage skill premium in the Republic of Korea 
between 1965 and the late 2000s
Source: Kwack (2010).
Table 5
Peninsular Malaysia: ratio of mean  
monthly household incomes by  
ethnic group and location
1970 1979 1990 1999 2004 2009
Chinese/ 
  Bumiputera 2.30 1.91 1.74 1.74 1.64 1.38
Indian/ 
  Bumiputera 1.73 1.54 1.29 1.36 1.27 1.10
Urban/Rural 2.14 1.77 1.70 1.81 2.11 1.85
Source: Jomo, 2006; and Ragayah, 2011.
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The expansion of the welfare system strengthened the redistributive capacity of fiscal policies (Sung, 
2009) and in 2007, the difference between the Gini of market income and disposable income was close 
to 4 points (table 6). The most important contribution came from direct taxation and cash transfers while 
consumption taxes worsened the income distribution by 0.85 points (ibid.). Private transfers also had a 
large redistributive effect. However, the recent expansion of the social security system reduced partially 
the dependence on private transfers.
Also Thailand introduced in the post-1997 era a set of 
redistributive measures ‘with a populist face’ which 
gained considerable political support, especially in 
poor rural areas (table 7). Such measures (introduced 
in 2001) included a three-year suspension of the 
debt of small farmers which benefited 1.9 million 
families (Trakarnvanich, 2010) and the introduction 
of micro-credit schemes via the Thailand Village 
and Urban Revolving Fund (URF). Although the 
programme had a little impact on average household 
spending and income, Boonperm et al. (2009: 20) 
showed that “most of the effect of URF borrowing is 
concentrated in the poorest quintile of the population 
…, where it raised spending by 5.2 per cent, making 
the programme markedly pro-poor”. A similar project 
was introduced in 2005, at village level with the 
intention of helping each village to cope with their 
communitarian problems. To reduce migration to 
the city and to favour local income generation, the government introduced also the One Tambon One 
Product (OTOP) programme which provides people with advice and technical assistance for the sale 
of their home productions. Finally, in 2005, government implemented the “Special Purpose Vehicle” 
(SPV) programme focusing on the creation of state enterprise supporting agricultural activities through 
the provision of inputs. In turn, a reform of the social protection system assured monetary transfers to 
poor elderly, introduced universal health coverage and extended free education to 15 years. All in all, 
these policies likely contributed to the poverty and inequality reduction recorded in recent years due to 
a significant shift away from old-style politics targeting benefits towards well-to-do constituencies and 
a new approach that aimed to build more consensus, providing the benefits of development in the poor 
rural areas (Ong, 2011).
Table 6
Redistributive effects based on the rates  
of changes in Gini coefficients, 2007
Reynolds – 
Smolensky
Market income + private transfers 1.42
Private income + public transfers 0.85
Gross income – income taxes 1.49
Gross income – income taxes – 
other direct taxes – social security 
contributions 1.85
Disposable income – indirect taxes -0.18
Total variation of Gini 3.94
Source: Sung, 2009.
Table 7
Thailand: selected interventions for poverty reduction
Selected interventions
Macro- and microeconomic 
management
• Village and urban revolving fund
• Debt moratorium for small farmers and agriculture
• One tambon one product
Capital building and enhancing 
employment ability
• School bicycle programme
• Ensuring completion of nine years of compulsory education
• 12 years of basic education of school-aged children from poor households
Social protection and social safety nets • Universal health insurance coverage (30 Baht treat all scheme)
• Cash transfers for indigent elderly
Natural resources management • Water resource management
• Land reform scheme
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on Trakarnvanich, 2010: 53.
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C. Rising inequality in most European economies in transition during the last decade
Between 2000 and 2007, EE-FSU recorded a solid rate of GDP growth (6.9 per cent) driven by large 
inflows of FDI and hard currency loans and – particularly for Central Europe and the Baltic – fast growing 
trade with Western Europe (by 2008 the exports/GDP ratio had reached 50 per cent as compared to 23 per 
cent in LA). Yet, despite fast growth and a modest improvement in income distribution between 1998 
and 2003 (figure 2) in 2003, income inequality started climbing slowly again with the result that over 
the conventional period 1998–2010 inequality rose (if less rapidly than during the transitional recession 
of the 1990s and often from still low levels) in 13 of the 24 countries of the region with comparable data 
(table 1).
What are the main features of the liberal policy approach followed in most of EE-FSU during the last 
decade? The key elements were: (a) fiscal policy was cautious and public deficits fell on average from 
about 3 per cent in 2000 to zero by 2007 (Hungary was a major exception); (b) tax policy introduced 
administrative simplifications, widened the use of VAT and introduced a flat tax on personal and corporate 
income. While the Baltic countries retained the highest pre-reform flat tax rate and increased the no-tax 
area (thus making the tax schedule relatively more progressive), most countries adopted very low rates 
(table 8). The ex-ante partial equilibrium effect of such reform was thus likely un-equalizing including 
because there is no evidence that the introduction of a flat tax generated Laffer-type responses leading 
to an increase in revenue and greater employment (Keen et al., 2008). While the effects of flat taxes are 
not necessarily regressive, it appears that the way such tax reform was introduced likely reduced tax 
progressivity, with the possible exception of the Baltic States (cfr. columns 3–8 in table 8 below).
In addition, (c) monetary policy and a broadly fixed exchange rate (see later) allowed or even encouraged 
a large increase in private indebtedness, which stimulated growth and imports but raised markedly the 
current account deficit which reached a startling 10–25 per cent of GDP over several years in the Baltics, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. These huge deficits were funded by an 
inflow of FDI and easy access to ‘cheap money’, i.e. hard-currency loans (both corporate loans and 
household mortgages) to the non-traded sector which gave rise to major currency mismatches, excessive 
dependence on global banks, high external indebtedness (Aslund, 2009) a sharp deterioration in the net 
foreign asset position of the region (figure 3) and growing vulnerability to the ‘sudden stops’ in capital 
Table 8
Countries adopting the flat tax in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
Country
Year of 
adoption
Personal income  
tax rates
Corporate income  
tax rates Changes 
in basic 
allowanceBefore After Before After
Estonia 1994 16–33 26 35 26 Increase
Lithuania 1994 18–33 33 29 29 Increase
Latvia 1997 10–25 25 25 25 Reduction
Russian Federation 2001 12–30 13 30 35 Increase
Ukraine 2004 10–40 13 30 25 Increase
Georgia 2005 12–20 12 20 20 Eliminated
Romania 2005 18–40 16 25 16 Increase
The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 2007 15–24 12 15 12 Unchanged
Kazakhstan 2007 5–20 10 30 30 Increase
Czech Republic 2008 12–25 15 24 22 Increase
Bulgaria 2008 10–24 10 10 10 Eliminated
Source: Keen, Kim and Varsano, 2008.
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inflows of 2009–2010 which had a negative effect on growth and income inequality; (d) trade policy was 
characterized by a free trade approach but a very high proportion of the output (especially that produced 
by the FDI) was exported to Western Europe, the same region from which most FDI originated. This made 
the external accounts of EE-FSU totally dependent on the business cycle of Western Europe; (e) most EE-
FSU countries anchored their exchange rates5 and only Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Serbia 
adopted a managed float. Yet, fixed pegs attracted short-term capitals which expanded money supply, 
appreciated the real exchange rate and worsened income distribution by shifting resources towards the 
capital and skilled-intensive non-traded sector and required drastic internal adjustments to respond to the 
2008–2009 crisis. For instance, in the Baltics, the balance of payments shock of 2008–2009 triggered 
a severe output collapse, bringing per capita income back to 2005 levels, which required an ‘internal 
devaluation’ consisting of an unprecedented fiscal adjustment (varying between 8.0 and 13.9 per cent of 
GDP in 2009 alone) a large wage compression (governments cut public wages by up to 35 per cent, and 
the private sector followed suit, Aslund, 2010) and a sharp rise in unemployment which compounded 
the fall of GDP caused by the 2008–2009 crisis (Purfield and Rosemberg, 2010). One and a half years 
after the onset of the crisis, the exchange rate was maintained, the banking system survived by injections 
of funds by the parent banks and external imbalances and inflation largely disappeared. However, 
unemployment rose by 10–12 percentage points, fiscal sustainability was still out of reach (despite the 
adjustment mentioned above), and the non-performing loans ratio of the banking system was 16-19 per 
cent in Latvia and Lithuania and 35 per cent in Ukraine (ibid.).6
With the major exception of the five Central European countries, the neo-liberal policy model adopted in 
much of the region during the 2000s placed a limited emphasis on labour market, public social expenditure 
and social assistance, possibly because such policies had been prominent (if not always efficient) during 
the communist period. In practice: (a) labour market policies were on average not very active in part 
due to the decline in unemployment observed during the rapid growth and substantive outmigration in 
almost half these countries. The minimum/average wage ratio stagnated at a low level while the skill 
premium rose because of the liberalization of wage formation, the decline in human capital formation 
during the 1990s (see later) and limited efforts at strengthening collective bargaining, unemployment 
insurance, public works and safety nets.7 (b) Despite rapid GDP growth, social protection expenditure 
stagnated for the region as a whole at 10 per cent of GDP. In addition, already since the 1990s investment 
in education was characterized by opening to the private sector, the development of costly private 
universities affordable only to well off and the introduction of user-fees in public institutions. As a result, 
the 1990s were characterized by a fall in enrolment rates in upper secondary education which, except 
in Central Europe and, in part, the Baltic countries, lasted till the mid 2000s (figure 6). The enrolment 
decline was very marked among pupils of vocational schools from low and middle income groups. These 
trends suggest that a growing number of youth did not enrol in secondary education and that the supply 
of skilled and semi-skilled workers declined over time, exacerbating in this way educational inequality 
and contributing to the upward shift in skilled wages relative to the unskilled ones.
(c) Social protection and social assistance, social protection systems in the region were and are highly 
heterogeneous and the related outlays range between 4 and 20 per cent of GDP. Except for the comprehensive 
and highly progressive systems operating in Central Europe, social protection remained heavily biased 
5 Slovenia and Slovakia adopted the Euro, Montenegro de facto adopted the Euro, the Baltic countries and Bulgaria 
established a currency board, and Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine adopted a dollar peg 
(Aslund, 2009).
6 Aslund (2010) argues that crisis resolution in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia was successful. He praises the decision to 
pursue an “internal devaluation” policy (which he argues is becoming the rule for eurozone countries facing financial 
difficulties) and the political economy of the crisis resolution, as the East European public accepted the hardship entailed 
by internal devaluation with minimal protests as external devaluation was seen as greater evil. 
7 Over 2000–2007, earnings inequality rose in one third of the countries, stagnated in another third and fell in the rest 
(UNICEF, 2009). Returns to education rose following wage liberalization, technological modernization and growing 
informalization (Mitra and Yemtsov, 2006).
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(as during the socialist era) towards little progressive 
pension systems. Unemployment benefit, sick pay 
and child allowances – which are much better 
targeted – remained underfunded. For instance, child 
benefits absorbed between 0.1 and 0.9 per cent of 
GDP. However, in six of the 12 countries with data 
this ratio declined between 2000 and the mid-2000s 
(UNICEF, 2009). Progress in the field of social 
assistance was also less marked than in other regions 
due to the initial lack of administrative infrastructure. 
Thus, while the communist social protection systems 
had a considerable impact on income inequality, the 
last decade has seen a steady erosion of this initial 
advantage. 
All in all, the liberal policy model adopted in the 
region generated a considerable growth acceleration 
until 2007 mid-2008 but run into four main problems 
which did not prevent a further increase in income 
inequality even for the pre-2008 years. First, the 
policies of pure trade and financial liberalization 
were lopsided. While they raised the region’s global 
integration, they rendered it excessively dependent 
on Western Europe (Nuti, 2009). Second, the region 
experienced a persistent and large current account 
deficit and rising external indebtedness which made 
it extremely vulnerable to the 2008–2009 crisis during which GDP contracted by over 5 per cent, as 
opposed to 0.4 per cent drop in LA and a 0.2 expansion in SEA. In this respect, the recent EE-FSU crisis 
is a repeat of the LA debt-led growth of the 1970s that ended with the debt crisis of the 1980s. Third, 
controversial macro, exchange rate and tax policies, reduced the policy flexibility required to respond 
effectively to the external shocks that hit the region since mid-2008. Furthermore, these policies gave 
rise to a pattern of growth that was often un-equalizing including during the roaring years of 2000–2007. 
Finally, the hands-off approach in the field of labour and social policy reduced (with the exception of the 
Central European countries) the volume of social transfers. Yet, the combined effect of rapid growth and 
moderately rising inequality made that the real incomes of the bottom deciles nevertheless increased.
D. The rapid rise of inequality in fast-growing China
After 30 years of breakneck growth, in 2010 China overtook Japan to become the world’s second largest 
economy. In many respects – growth, poverty alleviation, industrial transformation, macroeconomic 
balance, resilience to external shocks and so on – China outperformed all other emerging economies, 
let alone the advanced ones. Yet, this miraculous growth has not been without problems, in particular 
in terms of a seemingly unstoppable increase in income inequality which raised the Gini coefficient of 
the distribution of household income from 26.0 in 1975 and 30.4 in 1978 to 47.3 (or higher according to 
other estimates) in 20098 (table 9).
8 Other problems of the ‘Chinese growth miracle’ concern an excessive dependence on exports, imported technology 
and foreign firms in the export sector (Fisher, 2010); low expenditure on R&D, private consumption, public spending in 
education, health and social security; and growing pollution and low energy efficiency. The proposed strategies to solve 
these problems place greater emphasis on the domestic market (Yongdin, 2011), raising the share of domestic consumption 
and R&D on GDP, reducing the investment rate and the income gap between classes, urban-rural areas, and coastal areas 
and the hinterland, raise the share of services and make the economy less carbon-and energy intensive. 
Figure 6
Trends in gross enrolment rates in  
upper secondary education in sub-regions of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
(Percentage of the population aged 15–18)
Source: UNICEF, 2009.
Note: Changes in the definition of the variable do not allow 
to update these time series. 
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The distributive impact of market reforms in China has varied markedly according to the various reform 
waves. The first reforms of 1978–1984 pivoted around the Household Responsibility System in agriculture 
which replaced the rural communes with egalitarian family-based farms and raised the food procurement 
prices paid to farmers. Such measures led to an acceleration of agricultural and overall growth and reduced 
overall inequality thanks to a faster rise in rural incomes (table 9 and figure 2) while halving rural poverty 
from 30.7 per cent in 1978 to 15.1 per cent in 1984 (Gustafsson and Zhong, 2000).9 Meanwhile, the urban 
Gini coefficient stagnated at a low level (ibid.), as the initial introduction of performance-related bonuses 
in urban-based state enterprises did not cause any visible rise in income disparity.
In contrast, income concentration rose rapidly during the second phase of the reforms which began in 
1985 and which focused on promoting the urban-based industrial sector, with the result that the national 
Gini coefficient reached 41.1 by 1995 to rise further till the end of the decade (table 9, figure 2). Such rise 
can be traced to: (i) a rise in the urban–rural income gap driven by a faster expansion of urban activities, 
a 30 per cent decline in agricultural prices and a tripling of agricultural taxes levied by the central and 
local authorities (Ping, 1997); (ii) a rise in inter-provincial income inequality (last column of table 9) due 
to the unequal spread of non-agricultural activities; (iii) a widening within-rural and within-urban income 
inequality in most provinces due to a rise in corporate profits and earnings inequality driven by a rising 
demand for skilled workers in the modern sector and a surge in the skill premium (Luo and Zhong, 2008).
Though it succeeded in promoting growth and modernizing the economy, public policy was a main 
factor behind the income polarization observed during this period. Industrial policy favoured the coastal 
provinces over the interior ones through the selective granting of special administrative, tax and other 
privileges which facilitated the development of export industries and the inflow of FDI in coastal areas. 
In addition, the fiscal decentralization of 1978 led to a decline in the national tax/GDP ratio (which fell to 
12.6 per cent by 1996) and substantially reduced the ability of the central government to control regional 
inequality by means of transfers to poorer provinces.
Despite mounting concern among the central authorities, during the third phase (the ‘mercantilist era’ 
broadly coinciding with the last decade) the Gini coefficient grew further from 43.0 at the turn of the 
century to 47.3 in 2009 (Selden and Wu, 2011) or a slightly higher levels according to Luo and Zhu 
9 Overall inequality dropped also in the mid-1990s due to the increase in grain purchase price which reduced the urban-
rural income gap (Luo and Zhou, 2008).
Table 9
Evolution of the Gini coefficients and the income gap in China, 1953–2009
Gini coefficients Percentage contribution to overall Gini
Inter
provincial 
income 
gapOverall Rural Urban
Intra rural-
urban
Interaction 
term
Rural
inequality
Urban
inequality
Intra 
rural-urban 
inequality
Interaction 
term
1953 56.0 a ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
1978 30.4 21.2 16.0 18.3 0.1 36.7 3.3 59.2 0.5 12.6
1984 27.1 24.4 16.0 12.4 1.2 44.7 4.8 45.8 4.6 9.2 b
1990 35.1 31.0 23.0 17.7 1.9 36.3 7.6 50.5 5.4 7.5
1995 41.1 34.1 28.0 23.6 1.8 27.9 10.4 57.3 4.3 9.8
2000 43.2 35.4 31.9 25.1 2.2 20.2 16.4 58.0 5.1 ...
2006 46.2 37.4 33.6 28.0 1.8 12.7 22.9 60.7 3.8 ...
2009 47.3 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Source: Chen et al., 2010; for 2009, Selden and Wu, 2011; last column China’s State Bureau of Statistics.
a Non comparable with the rest of the data. 
b Refers to 1985.
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(2008). The recent increase in inequality derives from 
a number of offsetting tendencies. A fairly orthodox 
macroeconomic policy focused on low inflation, a 
low budget deficit (1.6 per cent of GDP on average 
over the last decade) and low ‘explicit’ government 
debt/GDP ratios,10 while capital controls and the 
accumulation of reserves minimized the importance 
of foreign savings in total investments and the impact 
of financial contagion. Cross-border capital controls 
were somewhat liberalized only after 2009. As a 
whole, these policies increased the macro resilience 
of the country and likely generated a neutral or 
mildly positive distributive effect. However, tax 
policy targeted a low tax/GDP ratio, preventing in 
this way to assign sufficient funds to public spending 
on health, education, pensions and other social areas, 
while its allocation continued to favour workers in 
the urban formal sector. Also, while the tax reform 
of 1994 re-centralized revenue collection and 
allocation, it failed in reducing income disparities 
across provinces, as the transfer mechanism from 
the centre to the provinces was not progressive. These problems started to be tackled only during the last 
few years (see later), as the tax/GDP ratio rose from 12.2 in 1996 to 22.5 in 2010.
This third reform phase emphasized more than the previous two an export-led growth strategy. Despite 
public programmes such as “Go West” and the improvement of infrastructure in the Western and Central 
provinces, trade and industrial policy continued to target the creation of Special Economic Zones in 
coastal areas, export-oriented firms and the capital intensive sector over the small-scale sector. Imports 
were gradually liberalized, particularly after the country joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
December 2001, though average tariffs remained comparatively high (16.5 per cent for the decade as a 
whole and 7.6 per cent in 2010). While in 1995, China officially adopted a managed floating exchange 
rate, until 2005 the yuan was de facto pegged (at a competitive rate) to the United States dollar. Since 
then, it fluctuated somewhat and over 2005–2011, it appreciated by 35 per cent vis-à-vis the United States 
dollar. Such export-led approach generated since 2001 large surpluses in the current and capital account 
(figure 7) which triggered a rapid accumulation of huge – excessive, according to some – currency reserves 
(US$ 1.3 trillion in 2011) which allowed to respond easily to the 2008–2009 crisis, thus minimizing its 
potentially negative distributive effects.
The success of this approach depended crucially on exchange rate and labour market policies. While 
the former may have generated offsetting effects on income inequality (more industrial jobs, if at lower 
real wages), labour policies contributed (beyond the pressures due to a large labour supply) to keeping 
wages low, reduce the labour share in total income and raising private, corporate and public savings to 
finance a rapid accumulation of capital. Indeed, much of the escalation in income inequality (prior to and) 
during the last decade pivoted around the hukou (internal passport) system, which means that migrants 
from rural areas receive lower wages and social benefits than urban workers. As noted by Selden and 
Wu (2011) while until the early 1980s the hukou system bound villagers to their local communities, the 
new system channels labour to industry and the cities while preserving highly differentiated wages and 
pay structures which permit firms and public entities to realize large savings and investments (table 10). 
Ironically – in the absence of health, education and retirement benefits – rural migrants must save out of 
their meager incomes to pay for housing, health, retirement and their children’s education.
10 If the non-performing loans of state banks are included, the debt/GDP ratio would be around an estimated 80 per cent.
Figure 7
China’s current account and  
overall balance of payments 
(Per cent of GDP)
Source: Authors’ compilation, based on Asian Development 
Bank database. 
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One of the most negative impact of the hukou 
system is rising inequality in children education, 
a trend which will influence the future distribution 
of human capital among workers and long-term 
income inequality. In recent years, China has made 
a major effort on higher education (Freeman, 2012) 
but the distributional aspects of this policy remain 
uncertain. Indeed, migrants often leave their children 
in their hometowns for schooling or send them back 
to lower quality rural schools after a brief period 
of education in the city where it is very difficult 
for them to enter public schools (Selden and Wu, 
2011). In 2003, the State Council instructed local 
governments to allocate funds for the compulsory education of migrants’ children but did not commit 
any funds to this programme.
State controlled trade-unions and lack of effective policies on wage regulation contributed to rising within-
urban and within-rural income inequality by moderating the requests for wage increases despite large 
rises in profits and productivity. According to the ILO’s Global Wage Report, real wages in China grew 
at an average rate of 12.9 per cent during 2001–2007. However, their initial level was very low, wage 
growth did not keep pace with output growth and the distribution of wages shifted in favour of skilled 
workers in the high-tech, financial and services sector (Luo and Zhu, 2008). Thus, the labour share in 
GDP – which had peaked at 56.5 per cent in 1983 during the agricultural reform years – fell to 36.7 per 
cent by 2005 (Selden and Wu, 2011). In addition, minimum wages (which are de facto set at the local 
level) declined as a share of average wages (table 11). This trend has been reversed very recently in a 
few provinces, as in 2011 over half of the municipalities and provinces in China raised their minimum 
wages by over 20 per cent.
Tax and social policy also contributed to the increase 
in income inequality. The post-1994 tax reforms 
reduced the incentives and capacity of the local 
bureaucracy to provide public goods. The autonomy 
given to local schools and hospitals has often led to 
their commercialization with the effect that the poor 
and migrants are often priced out of their services 
(Bardhan, 2010). According to a 2009 report by the 
National Bureau of Statistics, the migrants covered 
by the four major types of insurance – pension, health 
care, unemployment, and injury – were a meager 7.6, 
12.2, 3.9 and 21.8 per cent. Whereas in urban areas, 
social services still serve the majority of the resident 
population, in rural areas, there was a near-collapse 
of the rural social services (Selden and Wu, 2011), as after the 1994 tax reform, many local areas were 
left with unfunded mandates for basic social services.
As noted by Freeman (2012), the Chinese top policy-makers are well aware of the inefficiency and political 
instability entailed by the continuous rise in inequality and that such trend runs in the face of their stated 
goal of ‘constructing a harmonious society’. Indeed, as a result of growing polarization, social protests 
and wildcat strikes have become endemic. The number of labour disputes that workers brought to Labour 
Dispute Arbitration Committees increased from about 48,000 in 1996 to 1,280,000 in 2010 (ibid.). The 
government has tried to respond to the perceived political threat posed by rising inequality by strengthening 
the legal rights of migrant workers by enacting on 1 January 2008 a ‘contract labour law’ which requires 
employers to issue written contracts (which workers could take to court), limiting probationary periods 
Table 11
Ratio of minimum to average wage in three 
selected coastal cities in China
Year Shanghai Suzhou
Shenzen 
(SEZ)
1992 44.6 n.a. 49.6
1995 34.9 n.a. 37.1
2000 34.6 39.7 28.5
2005 30.9 33.1 25.5
2008 29.2 28.3 27.6
Source: Selden and Wu, 2011 on the basis of the Shanghai, 
Suzhou and Shenzen statistical yearbooks, various 
years.
Table 10
Chinese saving rate by sector
(Per cent of GDP)
Year Personal Corporate Government Total
1992 22.6 11.6 6.1 40.3
1995 19.8 14.6 5.8 40.2
2000 16.5 15.6 6.4 38.5
2005 21.2 20.0 6.3 47.5
2007 21.8 18.4 10.6 50.9
Source: Selden and Wu, 2011, on the basis of the Chinese 
National Accounts, various years.
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to two years, giving a permanent contract to workers with ten years’ experience with a firm, restricting 
worker dismissal, increasing severance pay, raising minimum wages, allowing trade unions to become 
genuine representatives of workers and improving the dispute resolution system. Surveys of migrant 
workers in the Pearl River Delta before and after law took effect suggest that the law was effective in 
improving the workers conditions (Li and Freeman, 2012), though much remains to be done.
E. Summing up: lessons from the four regional case studies discussed above
Despite the structural differences existing among the four regions analysed, a comparison of the drivers of 
the inequality changes recorded therein over the past two decades permits to come to a few fairly general 
conclusions which – mutatis mutandis – may help inspire future policy action in developing countries. 
The first observation is that – after the shocks induced by the domestic liberalization and opening of the 
economy of the 1980s and 1990s – some countries (especially in South America and South East Asia) 
have shown that it is possible to reduce inequality under open economy conditions and in the presence of 
continuous technological shocks if a new policy model (which we name for convenience ‘open economy 
growth with equity’) is adopted. This encouraging conclusion differs in an important way from the 
predictions of some authoritative researchers (Rodrik, 1997) about the unavoidable un-equalizing effect of 
the opening of the economy. At the same time, the above comparison shows that the unfettered adoption 
of domestic and – especially – external liberalization (as in several former European socialist economies) 
or of highly unbalanced industrial, regional, educational and tax policies (as in China) have lead to a rapid 
rise in inequality which may threaten social stability and increase the vulnerability to external shocks.
The ‘open economy growth with equity model’ which has taken shape in those developing regions which 
experienced a drop in inequality during the last decade is a ‘hybrid model’ which combines elements of 
the orthodox liberal model (a focus on fairly low inflation, budget deficit and public debt) with innovative 
approaches in the fields of countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy, taxation, managed exchange rate 
regime, reduction of the foreign debt, banking regulation and the role of domestic public banks, capital 
controls, trade diversification and so on which rendered these economies more resilient to the liberalized 
trade and financial environment within which they operate. Interestingly, while all four regions analysed 
followed a broadly similar stance in terms of low inflation, budget deficit and public debt, the countries 
adopted more pronounced changes – which contributed to the reduction of inequality – in terms of managed 
exchange rates, external indebtedness, progressive taxation, domestic banking regulation, capital controls 
and trade diversification (China is an intermediate case, as it adopted some of these policies but not others).
Table 12
Percentage of workers in the Pearl River Delta covered by contracts and  
with social insurance and percentage reporting rights violations,  
before and after the contract labour law
2006 2009 Change
Contract coverage 42.7 62.4 19.6
Open-end contract 15.2 17.3 2.1
Union existence 16.0 18.6 2.6
Medical insurance 33.0 52.0 19.0
Age insurance 21.9 37.9 16.0
Injury insurance 42.9 56.8 13.9
Unemployment insurance 8.3 20.5 12.2
Wage arrears 8.9 7.2 -1.7
Rights violation experience 23.7 5.7 -18.0
Source: Li and Freeman, 2012.
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Clear differences were recorded also in terms of educational, labour market and social protection policies. 
A key driver of the inequality changes was the extent of support of public education (especially at the 
secondary level). In this regard, the strong increase in public expenditure on education recorded during 
the last 15–20 years in most Latin America as well as in the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and – to a lesser 
extent – Thailand appears to have generated a ‘quantity effect’ (a more egalitarian distribution of human 
capital) and a ‘price effect’ (i.e. a drop in the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages), which helped equalized 
the wage distribution. In contrast, in both China and some European economies in transition (with the 
clear exception of the Central European ones), public expenditure on education dropped substantially 
while several services were privatized with the effect that the supply of skilled worker stagnated or 
declined and the wage premium increased. Also labour market policies differed drastically between the 
regions which experienced declining inequality and the two which saw it rise. In the first, there was a 
clear drive towards re-formalizing employment, strengthening collective bargaining, increasing minimum 
wages and other policies favourable to labour, while the opposite was true (until very recently) in the 
two counterfactual region, especially in China where the hukou system segments the labour market 
and affects negatively the wage distribution. Finally, important policy differences were recorded also 
in the field of social protection and especially social assistance. While the initial conditions were more 
favourable in the European economies in transition and China (both of which enjoyed fairly universal 
social protection systems during the communist era), the subsequent trends point to a weakening of such 
provisions in these countries and an increase in targeted social assistance and protection programmes in 
Latin America and South-East Asia.
Interestingly, not much of the inequality decline recorded during the last decade in Latin America and 
South-East Asia can be attributed to policies aiming at removing the “structural causes of inequality” – 
such an unequal distribution of assets, credit, subsidies and opportunities, removing market inefficiencies 
and reducing rural-urban, spatial and ethnic income gap. Thailand (which attempted to reduce rural-urban 
inequality) and Malaysia (which reduced inter-ethnic differences) are obvious exceptions (see above). 
And so were the greater efforts in the field of education recorded in a greater number of countries.
Finally, as well demonstrated by the Chinese experience, the recent changes in inequality, seems to be 
more affected by the pattern of growth, rather than by the rate of growth. Likewise, exogenous changes 
in international conditions (terms of trade, financial exuberance and remittances) do not appear to have 
played on average a major role, with the possible exception of a limited number of countries in Latin 
America where these factors are central to the functioning of the economy (such as migrant remittances 
in El Salvador). Also in this case however, the effect appears to be due to specific local conditions, as 
no decline in inequality was recorded in other countries with similar – if less marked – characteristics. 
Similar conclusions seems to hold for the impact of dependency rates and participation rates, which did 
at best influence marginally the changes in inequality over the last decade in the four regions analysed.
F. An empirical test of the determinants of income inequality
Within the constraints imposed by data availability we now test empirically the contribution of the factors 
discussed in the prior two sections to the observed changes in income inequality. To this end, a database 
was built including annual data for 104 countries and the variables specified below over the period 
1980–2010 (Martorano and Cornia, 2012). Given the panel structure of such database, the estimation 
procedure must take into account that each country is observed over several periods. The most suitable 
specification for this type of dataset takes the following form:
 GINIit = α + βXit + ηi + yt + uit;  i = 1, 2, …, N; t = 1, 2, …, T     (1),
where i and t denote country and time period, ηi is the time-invariant country’s fixed effect, yt the error 
term for each year and uit a joint error term for countries and time periods. The dependent variable is 
Giniit that is the Gini coefficient of the distribution of household disposable income per capita (see 
22
annex table A.2). X is a vector of explanatory variables11 which are clustered into six groups: (i) external 
conditions i.e. international terms of trade, migrant remittances and FDI; (ii) the rate of growth of GDP 
(which might be expected ex-ante to reduce inequality, though as argued above this effect depends more 
on the pattern than the rate of growth); (iii) the distribution of human capital among workers, proxied by 
the average years of education (which is also expected to reduce inequality); (iv) fiscal policies, proxied 
by the ratio of direct on indirect tax revenue and the share of social protection on total public expenditure 
(both expected to reduce inequality); and (v) macroeconomic policy, proxied by the real effective exchange 
rate, the Kaopen and the financial regulation indexes both of which are expected to increase inequality.
The signs of the parameters presented in table 13 (model 1) confirm in most cases the direction of causality 
predicted ex-ante. To start with, the gains in terms of trade contributed directly to the reduction of income 
inequality. Moreover, the parameters of the linear and quadratic term of the migrant remittances are both 
significant, confirming that in the early phase, migration is dis-equalizing (as the middle income people 
are generally the first to migrate and send back remittances) but that with the creation of migrant networks 
which reduce the cost of migration also the low income people have a chance of seeking employment abroad 
and send back remittances to their low income families, with an equalizing effect on the distribution of 
income. Lastly, the FDI stock increases inequality but its coefficient is not statistically significant though 
analyses for Latin America show they are strongly un-equalizing (Cornia, 2012).
Secondly, the coefficient of the GDP growth rate is non-significant, thus confirming that the inequality 
decline depends more on the growth pattern than on the growth rate. As expected, the years of education 
of workers is negatively related to income inequality. As for the impact of fiscal policy, direct taxation is 
found to be associated in a strongly significant and negative way to income inequality, while the ratio of 
outlays on social protection on total public expenditure is not significant. This result is likely due to the 
impossibility of breaking down the time series of social assistance into social security expenditure (which 
has a limited or even regressive effect on income inequality) and social assistance (which is strongly 
equalizing). As for the macroeconomic policies, the real effective exchange rate coefficient is positive 
and strongly significant, confirming that a competitive real exchange rate could help equalize income 
distribution, while – as expected – the index of capital account liberalization (Kaopen index) and those 
of financial regulation are both dis-equalizing, even though only the former is significant.
G. An empirical test of the determinants of the growth rate of GDP per capita
We now estimate a regression of the determinants of GDP growth rate, as this variable is generally 
considered an important determinant of income inequality and in view of estimating simultaneously the 
Gini equation and the GDP growth equation so as to solve any possible endogeneity problem due to the 
circular causation effects between these two variables (see section III.H).
In addition, it is important to explore what is the likely impact on GDP growth of the inequality changes 
discussed above. In particular, is there any evidence that the rise in income inequality observed in many 
countries affected growth? The relation between income inequality (or its changes over time) and GDP 
growth has been extensively analysed in both theoretical and empirical terms, and 80 per cent of the 
theoretical models posit a monotonically negative or concave relation between these two variables. 
Except for the Keynesian models which focus on differences in rates of savings of profit recipients and 
high-wage earners in relation to low-wage earners (Pasinetti, 1974) and the Upper Mobility theories 
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005), most theoretical analyses and empirical studies show that high inequality 
correlates negatively with GDP growth. The ‘political economy models’ (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994) 
argue that high initial inequality damages growth as it leads to the election of governments which favour 
redistribution through high marginal tax rates, which depress private investment and growth. In turn, in 
11 See annex table A.2.
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the ‘capital-market imperfections’ model (Aghion et al., 1999) high inequality harms growth as it leads 
to slow human capital formation, locks investments by the rich in low return activities while the poor – 
who have projects with higher rates of return – cannot invest more than their limited endowments due to 
capital market imperfections. Thirdly, Venieris and Gupta (1986); Bourguignon (1998) and others show 
that high inequality may cause street protests and high crime which create uncertainty among investors, 
Table 13
Regression of the Gini coefficient of household disposable income per capita (models 1 and 3) 
and the growth rate of GDP (models 2 and 4) on several independent variables by means of the 
Least Square Dummy Variables estimator (columns 1 and 2) and  
3SLS estimator (columns 3 and 4), 1980–2010
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
LSDV LSDV 3SLS estimator 3SLS estimator
Dependent variable
Independent variables
Gini income
inequality
Growth rate 
of GDP
Gini income
inequality
Growth rate
of GDP
Gini coefficient of income inequality ... -0.0131 ... -0.4654*
International terms of trade index -0.0086** 0.0066 0.0015 0.0088
Remittances (per cent GDP) 0.4373*** ... 0.3820*** ...
Remittances ( per cent GDP) ^2 -0.0203*** ... -0.0171*** ...
FDI (per cent GDP) 0.0161 ... 0.018 ...
Investment rate (per cent GDP) ... 0.2402*** ... 0.6982***
Kaopen index of capital account liberalization 0.3278*** 0.0668 0.2386*** -0.1195
GDP growth rate -0.0089 ... -0.0763 ...
Average years of education of the workforce -1.2107*** ... -1.1366*** ...
Annual absolute change of share of workers  
with 2ary/3ary education ... -1.6556 ... 1.8703
Direct/indirect Taxes -0.6554*** ... -0.5816*** ...
Social protection (per cent government 
expenditure) 0.0109 ... -0.0132 ...
Bank deregulation index 0.0209 0.1137 0.3302*** -0.1426
Real effective exchange rate index 0.0155*** -0.0027*** 0.0101*** -0.0194***
Currency reserves (per cent GDP) ... 0.0015 ... 0.0185
Change of debt/GDP ratio (if > 60 per cent) ... -0.0634*** ... -0.0731***
Annual percentage change in inflation rate  
(if > 40 per cent) ... -0.0008** ... -0.0007*
Annual absolute change in Polity IV index ... 0.0987** ... 0.1446
Constant 44.216*** -5.9237** 39.7984*** 18.3863
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1 329 1 583 1 272 1 272
R-squared 0.961 0.459 0.968 0.298
Hansen-Sargan test for overidentifying 
restrictions (p-value) n.a. n.a. 0.522
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: *Significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent.
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erode property rights, raise transaction and security costs and reduce growth. Fourthly, high asset and 
income inequality reduce the scope for conducting rational economic policies, as they restrict the supply of 
pro-growth public goods, lead to the adoption of lax macroeconomic policies and a high risk of defaulting 
on international debt, as governments are unable to tax the elites and are so impelled to borrow abroad or 
rely on seignorage (Birdsall, 2000). In turn, Cornia (2004) argues that the relation between inequality and 
growth is concave. Before a given Gini threshold (estimated between 0.35 and 0.42, and varying across 
different types of economies), inequality improves incentives and growth, while beyond that it increases 
labour shirking, free riding and supervision costs, erodes the social contract, and may force the poor to 
over-exploit common goods such as forests and grazing land. Finally, a recent article by Kumhof and 
Rancière (2011) on the advanced economies argues that high income concentration affects growth as the 
poor and middle class increasingly borrow (including from abroad) so as to maintain their consumption 
level despite falling incomes, with the effect of increasing their debt-to-income ratios, worsening the 
current account/GDP ratio and – because of all this – increasing the vulnerability to crises.
A key point in this debate is whether it is the level of inequality or its change over time which affects 
growth. In this regard, it is often argued that fast growth in countries such as China and Viet Nam has 
been accompanied by a substantial increase in income inequality which in 2008/2009 exceeded that 
of Argentina and Uruguay. For sure, the impact of an inequality rise on growth depends on its ‘initial 
inequality level’. In this sense, as in China the initial Gini was extremely low, particularly in urban areas 
(table 9), several years of increases did not generate any perceptible effect on growth. Yet, as suggested 
by Cornia (2004) and by section III.D, further increases from say a Gini of 40–42 may generate adverse 
effects on growth through one or another of the pathways mentioned above. A second observation is that 
there are medium to long time lags between a rise in inequality and GDP growth. This means that even 
under the present authoritarian regime, rising social tensions could affect growth in China and countries 
in similar situations in a few years. Fifthly, the relation between inequality and growth is influenced by 
the kind of political regime existing in a country. Under democracy, high inequality may lead – as recently 
shown by different waves of the Latinobarometro (see section III.A) – to the election of governments 
which attach greater importance to social justice much faster than in authoritarian regimes (as in “growth 
superstars” such as China and Viet Nam). Econometric evidence shows that in Latin America increasing 
demand for distributive justice lead to redistributive policies more frequently and pronouncedly in 
centre-left regimes than centre right regimes (Cornia, 2012). Be what as it may, the empirical evidence 
show that stable and high inequality affects growth – if moderately – both during the current period and/
or with some time lag. 
To test the relation between inequality and growth, we chose the specification chosen for the GDP growth 
equation is as follows:
 
 GDP_growthit = α + β . GINIit + γ . Xit + ηi + yt + uit;  i = 1,…, N; t = 1, …, T    (2),
where beyond the Giniit – the coefficient of the distribution of household disposable income per capita – we 
included some of the other explanatory variables (defined in detail in annex table A.2) used in standard 
growth equations. The first is the ratio of gross fixed capital formation (both private and public) to GDP, 
as higher investments increase aggregate demand and the GDP equilibrium level over the short term, as 
well as the potential growth rate of GDP over the long term. Many new growth theories also emphasize the 
role of human capital. In particular, in the endogenous growth model, human capital generates perpetual 
growth by either preventing returns to a capital from falling or by increasing capabilities for the innovation 
and adaptation of new technologies. To capture this effect, we use as proxy the changes in human capital 
formation the change over time in the share of workers with secondary and tertiary education. We also 
introduced a set of control variables (some of which were used also in the Gini inequality equation), 
such as the international terms of trade index, the real effective exchange rate, the Kaopen index and the 
financial regulation index to proxy some of the macroeconomic policies. In addition, we added the level 
of the currency reserves/GDP (which is expected to improve economic performance), the changes in 
debt/GDP and inflation which are expected to reduce growth in heavily indebted countries (60 per cent 
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of GDP) and when the rate of inflation exceeding 40 per cent a year. Finally, we introduce the polity 2 
index which measures the quality of democracy, so as to capture the impact of democracy and institutions 
on economic performance.
As can be seen from table 13 (model 2), in almost all cases the parameters of these variables take the 
signs predicted ex-ante on the basis of the literature. As expected, an increase of the investment rate 
affects favourably economic performance. For instance, a growth of one point of the investment/GDP 
ratio increases the GDP growth rate by 0.24 points. As for the macroeconomic variables, GDP growth is 
negatively conditioned by the increase of the debt level and the inflation above a certain threshold (table 
13). Furthermore, a high level of the REER (indicating appreciation) affects growth negatively showing 
that a competitive real exchange rate could not be only good in equalizing income distribution (table 13, 
model 1) but also for growth (ibid., model 2). Also, the process of democratic consolidation favoured 
economic growth as shown by the coefficient of the annual change in the Polity 2 index which is positive 
and significant. Finally, table 13 (model 2) shows that the coefficient of the Gini index, human capital, 
gains in terms of trade, reserve level, Kaopen index of financial liberalization and the index of financial 
regulation are not statistically significant.
H. A simultaneous estimation of the determinants of inequality and growth
Until now, we estimated the Gini and growth equations as single equations even though economic theory 
suggests there can be a reverse causation between these two variables. If true, this would mean that the 
parameters estimated in models 1 and 2 are biased and that there is a need to use a different estimator to 
solve this problem of circular causation. To do so, we estimate a system of simultaneous equations – where 
both the Gini and Growth equation are jointly determined – by means of the three-stage least squares 
(3SLS) estimator. The post-estimation tests (table 13 models 3 and 4) show that the system is correctly 
identified while the Hansen-Sargan test confirms that the instruments are valid.12
The results of the 3SLS procedure generate better estimates of the parameters and – to a very large extent 
– confirm the findings of models 1 and 2. In particular, in the inequality equation, all variables show the 
sign expected ex-ante and the bank deregulation index becomes significant though the international terms 
of trade index is no longer significant. In addition, the parameters of the linear and quadratic terms of 
migrant remittances are again both significant. In the same way, a rise in the average years of education 
of the workforce is associated with a lower Gini coefficient. As for the impact of tax and macro policies, 
a greater contribution of direct taxation and a competitive exchange rate regime are found to equalize 
income distribution. Finally – as expected – an increase of the index of capital liberalization (Kaopen 
index) and those of financial regulation are un-equalizing. As in the single Gini equation, the FDI stock, 
GDP growth and the ratio of social protection on total public expenditure are again not significant.
Finally, considering the parameters of the growth equation estimated with the 3SLS, it is interesting to 
observe that inequality affects negatively economic development (while it did not in model 2) possibly 
due to the erosion of individual work incentives and of social cohesion. Thus, a reduction of one points 
of Gini income increases GDP growth rate by 0.5 points. Moreover, changes in the Kaopen index, bank 
regulation and REER which are detrimental for income inequality affect negatively also economic 
performance. Nonetheless, only the REER coefficient is statistically significant. Again, the coefficient of 
debt and inflation are negative and significant. Finally, the coefficient of reserve and human capital and 
that for the international terms of trade are not statistically significant (as in model 2), while the variation 
in polity 2 index become non-significant.
12 To check identification status of the simultaneous equations system, we used the checkreg3 stata module developed 
by Baum (2007). To compute the Hansen-Sargan test of the overidentifying restrictions, we used the overid stata module 
developed by Baum et al. (1999).
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iv. the impact of the 2009–2010 cRisis on inequality
The inequality impact of the economic crisis which began in 2008 and is still gripping parts of the world 
economy (despite a modest return to growth in 2010) is not yet well documented, except in the OECD, 
EE-FSU and Latin America (table 14). The evidence in table 14 refers to only 39 countries and does not 
seem to suggest a generalized inequality rise, though figure 8 on Latin America shows that the pace of 
inequality decline slowed during 2009–2010. This somewhat surprising result may also be due to the 
fact that the crisis has affected more the advanced and middle income economies rather than the low 
income ones.
In the absence of adequate empirical information, a few theoretical and historical considerations may be 
of help to fathom the impact of the current crisis on inequality. The first observation is that the relation 
Table 14
Absolute changes (Gini points) in the main regions over 2000–2008 and 2008–2010
Region 2000–2008
(Countries with falling 
inequality / number of 
countries per region) 2008–2010
(Countries with falling 
inequality / number of 
countries per region)
Latin America -2.0 (13/18) -1.5 (7/9)
SSA -0.5a (9/21) … …
MENA -0.2 a (3/8) … …
South Asia +2.2a (0/5) -0.2 (0/2)
South-East Asia -0.7 (3/6) +0.9 (1/2)
EE–FSU +1.4 (7/24) -0.2 (3/10)
Advanced economies +0.9 (3/21) -0.5 (4/16)
China +7.9 +0.8b
Source: Authors’ compilation, based on Martorano and Cornia, 2012.
a 2008 or latest available data in the 2000s.
b 2008–2009.
Figure 8
Percentage of change in GDP and Gini coefficient in Latin American countries  
in three periods: 1980–2000, 2000–2008 and 2008–2010
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on data included in Martorano and Cornia, 2012. 
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between crises and inequality is a complex one, the outcomes of which depend on the specific genesis, 
characteristics and extent of each crisis, the functioning of the labour market, the crises duration and the 
nature of the macroeconomic, labour market and social policies adopted to confront them. Economic 
theory suggests that in developing countries with flexible labour markets and no formal social safety 
nets a recession worsens labour absorption and, under certain conditions, the wage rate, with negative 
distributive effects, as illustrated by the change in the regression parameters across the three panels 
on Latin America for the period 1980–2000, 2000–2008 and 2008–2010 (figure 8). In contrast, in the 
advanced countries with unified labour markets, downward sticky wages and unemployment insurance, 
recessions may reduce inequality as firms hoard labour so as to avoid future selection and hiring costs. 
Thus profits fall while the job contraction is mostly compensated by unemployment benefits. However, 
the increasing segmentation of labour markets and protection policies in the OECD has eroded the validity 
of these conclusions.
Secondly, it is necessary to pay attention to the genesis of each crisis and ensuing recession given the 
structure of the economy analysed. For instance, in Indonesia inequality fell over 1997–1999 in the 
aftermath of the Asian crisis which hit first the employees of the highly-paid financial sector and only 
subsequently the unskilled workers who often returned to rural areas where they could count on alternative 
livelihoods unavailable to the upper income group (figure 9, left panel). In contrast, in the more urbanized 
Republic of Korea (which then lacked unemployment insurance – see section III.B) the Gini coefficient 
rose for two consecutive years after the crisis, despite a rapid return to the long-term growth path, as the 
unemployment rate thus rose sharply, to return then to 4.6 by 2001 (see section III.B). In addition, the 
share of part time and daily workers not covered by social insurance jumped from 42.5 to 52.5 per cent 
and the wage spread by employment type widened (KLSI, 2001). As a result, between 1996 and 1999, 
the labour share in total income fell from 64 to 60 per cent while Gini rose (figure 9, right panel). 
Thirdly, the inequality impact depends also on the functioning of the labour market and related policies. 
For instance, labour markets in Latin America were little affected by the 2009 crisis. While unemployment 
rose in eight of the 11 countries analysed in a World Bank (2010) study, the average increment was of 
only 0.9 while the real wages remained strong, in part due to the fall of inflation of 2009. Informality 
Figure 9
Impact of the Asian crisis of 1997 on the Gini coefficient of income inequality in  
Indonesia and the Republic of Korea
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on data included in Martorano and Cornia, 2012. 
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rose modestly (0.3–0.4 points on average) mainly in countries with rising unemployment. Finally, the 
skilled/unskilled, formal/informal and male/female wage gaps continued to fall, possibly because of the 
adoption of vigorous labour market and social protection policies in several countries of the region. As 
a result, average income inequality in the region continued falling – by 1.5 Gini points – as six countries 
continued experiencing a drop in inequality and there are no changes (Cornia, 2012).
v. conclusions: policies to ReDuce inequality anD  
pRomote gRowth in an open economy
While, as noted in section II, the unfettered liberalization and globalization of the 1980s and 1990s led to a 
widespread increase in growth instability and income inequality, the recent experience of Latin America and 
a few South-East Asian countries suggests that public policy can help reduce inequality even under open 
economy conditions (and containing its increase under crisis conditions) if a given set of macroeconomic, 
taxation, labour and social policies is adopted by governments which – under democracy – face strong 
incentives to focus on equity. This is an important conclusion which is at variance with earlier findings 
about the ‘race to the bottom’ and related distributional worsening of fast globalizing countries. The 
policy approach illustrated below may thus permit to enjoy the static and dynamic efficiency gains from 
trade (due to economies of scale in production, ‘vent for surplus’ effects, easier access to technology and 
other factors) and a selective access to foreign finance without causing an inequality-efficiency trade-off. 
A second important message is that the experience of the European economies in transition and of China 
debunks the common view that income inequality is best reduced by rapid growth and the subsequent 
increase in labour absorption. While growth may lead to lower inequality, what matters the most is the 
pattern of growth (whether capital-intensive, jobless, or employment-intensive, agriculture-driven and so 
on). At the same time, there is evidence that – at least under democracy – inequality may make growth 
less sustainable over the medium-term for social reasons.
Which are then the policies which would allow to achieve an equitable growth? The suggestions below 
– inspired to a large extent by the regional experiences reviewed in section III – are of general nature. 
Specific measures will have to be introduced to reflect the different size, economic specialization, level of 
development and institutions of the countries analysed. Yet, these general measures offer a general guidance 
on how to avoid crises, promote growth and reduce inequality. The first set of policies (section V.A) 
concern the new (broadly understood) macroeconomic policies and the complementary labour and social 
policies which have been shown to reduce inequality under open economy conditions. However, as well 
illustrated by the Latin American and South-East Asian experience discussed in sections III.A and III.B, 
while such measures offset to a considerable extent the rise in inequality due to the Washington Consensus 
policies of the 1980s and 1990s they hardly made a dent in the deep-seated ‘structural inequality’ inherited 
from the past and due to the time-old social stratification still observed in many developing countries. 
For reasons of space, the policies required to reduce structural inequality are discussed only very briefly 
alluded to in section V.B for reasons of completeness, but obviously require a much more detailed and 
country-specific analysis of what is presented below.
A. Policies to reduce the income inequality induced by the opening of the economy
The world within which policy decisions are taken has profoundly changed, especially since the 1990s. 
To start with, the traditional problems (e.g. high foreign debt and inflation) that led to the adoption of 
Draconian austerity measures in the 1980s and 1990s have been eliminated and therefore no longer 
require painful adjustments. This guarantees more degrees of freedom in policy making. At the same time, 
during the 2000s policy-making in developing and transitional countries has been increasingly influenced 
by the seemingly unstoppable spread of financial globalization, the unsustainable fiscal policy of the 
United States, the sovereign debt crisis of Europe and the contagion caused by banking and financial 
crises emanating from advanced countries lacking adequate banking regulation and financial supervision. 
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Meanwhile, a widespread trade and capital account liberalization has drastically narrowed the scope of 
domestic policy making and forced governments to adopt (at times sub-optimal) ‘defensive policies’ 
(such as the accumulation of huge reserves) to compensate for the instability and expectations of global 
markets and the constraints imposed by the WTO. Finally, as countries are now much more interdependent 
than before, cross-country and cross-sectoral contagion is far more pervasive and damaging than before, 
especially as firewalls and global safety nets to stop or offset its impact are still broadly missing. Given 
all this, and while waiting for the development of appropriate global policies and institutions to reduce 
instability and contagion, the comparison of the regional experiences discussed above suggests that a 
reduction of inequality under (often unstable) open economy conditions requires the adoption of the 
following domestic macro policies and complementary industrial, labour and social policies:
1. Macroeconomic policies, including trade policy and financial regulation
The experience of the last ten years points to the emergence of a ‘new macroeconomic approach’ compatible 
with the reduction of inequality which includes the following measures: 
- Limiting foreign indebtedness and mobilizing domestic savings: the liberalization of the current account 
has been presented as a golden opportunity to access a global pool of savings and speed up capital 
accumulation and job creation. Yet, the experience of the European economies in transition (section III.C) 
and the related literature suggest that excessive reliance on foreign finance often ends up in ‘financial 
traps’ characterized by currency mismatches, high risk-premia, exposure to sudden stops, rises in 
domestic interest rate driven by the spreads on foreign loans, an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
and the allocation of funds to non-priority sectors, i.e. all phenomena which affect both growth and 
inequality (see table 13). Such risks decline but do not disappear if the capital inflows take the form 
of FDI. In contrast, economies with larger banking systems and high investment ratios have smaller 
portfolio inflows than those depending on foreign savings (China and Malaysia are good examples in 
this regard).
 Thus, the recourse to foreign resources should be selective and sustainable, and countries with large 
foreign debt should reduce it, as done successfully in recent times in several developing regions. This 
means that capital accumulation should be funded mainly by mobilizing domestic savings through 
the development of a well regulated banking network, as shown by the past experience of Japan and 
more recently of Malaysia, China and some Latin American countries (Rojas Suarez, 2010). It means 
also assigning a greater role to public banks which can behave counter-cyclically, as observed in the 
case of the Brazilian BNDES which in 2009 expanded credit to compensate the ‘flight to security’ of 
foreign and domestic private banks. Domestic savings can be raised also by harnessing the resources of 
pension funds, tightening consumption credit and – obviously – ensuring there are sufficient incentives 
to invest. Finally, especially in the 60 or so developing countries with tax/GDP ratios below 10–12 per 
cent, public savings can be raised to finance SME, infrastructure and the green economy by increasing 
tax pressure, as observed during the last decade in parts of Latin America, the three South-East Asian 
countries analysed and, very recently, China.
- Controlling capital inflows and harnessing their sectoral allocation: in countries with an abundant 
labour supply, green-field FDI in manufacturing are likely to generate positive growth and distributional 
effects, as shown by the past experience of Malaysia, Mauritius and a few Central American countries. 
The impact of FDI in other sectors needs instead closer assessment as they may generate trade-offs and 
require compensatory measures, e.g. public work schemes for the people made redundant. In contrast, 
even in the presence of sound macroeconomic policies and strong regulatory institutions, countries 
should be free to impose market-based and administrative controls on portfolio inflows and outflows 
if these are likely to cause large swings in the real exchange rate (which the regression analysis in 
table 13 shows is key for both inequality and growth). Such measures have been introduced recently 
in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, were only slightly relaxed in 2009 in China and were common in 
the 1990s in Colombia, Spain, Chile, Malaysia, India and other countries. In addition, the central bank 
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can set limits on the foreign exposure of domestic banks, forbid banks to borrow internationally and 
to extend loans to the non-tradable sector. The IMF (2011) now supports introduction of temporary 
controls during crisis periods, but countries may consider introducing them ex-ante and to keep them 
in place as long as they are needed, as China has done for long. 
- Long-term equilibrium or small surplus of the current account balance: consistently, with the objective 
of reducing dependence on foreign savings and contrary to the policy of large current account deficits 
recorded during the 1980s and 1990s, the developing economies should aim at improving their current 
account position and at recording where feasible a long-term fiscal balance or modest surplus. This 
objective was achieved during the last 20 years by several economies, with the exception of the non-
oil transitional economies of EE-FSU where current account deficit rose sharply to over 10 per cent of 
GDP (see section III.C).
- Choosing an intermediate exchange rate regime: such a regime should minimize the risk of currency 
crises and at the same time provide incentives for the expansion of the traded sector where the majority 
of the poor often (but not necessarily) works. This means rejecting the views about the superiority 
of ‘two corner solutions’ over intermediate regimes. Indeed, as shown in section III.C the EE-FSU 
countries suffered larger GDP falls in 2009 including because of the adoption of currency boards and 
fixed pegs, while the countries of Latin America and the South-East Asia analysed in this paper adopted 
intermediate regimes which allowed them to stabilize to a considerable extent the real exchange rate 
and to swiftly respond to external shocks. It is obviously difficult to generalize, but in small-medium 
developing countries exporting a large share of their output, an intermediate regime aiming at credibly 
stabilizing the real exchange rate and its expectations seems to be the best option. An example of such an 
exchange rate regime is the ‘basket, band and crawl’ regime adopted in Chile in the 1990s (Williamson, 
2003) and in Argentina during the 2000s (Frenkel and Rapetti, 2008). In these countries, a managed 
float, combining nominal exchange rate flexibility with discretionary interventions of the central bank 
in the foreign exchange market and the accumulation of substantial currency reserves13 (to mitigate 
the appreciation of the real exchange rate during periods of bonanza or its collapse on occasion of 
large external shocks) appear to be the best policy.14 The econometric results in table 13 as well as the 
empirical evidence (Rodrik, 2008) confirm that a stable and competitive exchange rate is a key factor 
in kick-starting growth, improving long-term performance and keeping inequality within a reasonable 
range. However, this approach leads to a slower decline of inflation and needs to be supported by 
countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies, capital controls and interventions in the currency market.
- Trade policy: as noted in section II, in many cases the trade liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s led 
to a worsening of income distribution due to short run factors immobility, trade-induced skilled biased 
technological change, the perverse effects of simultaneous trade and capital account liberalization and 
other factors (Koujanou-Goldberg and Pavcnick, 2007; Taylor, 2004). Yet, practically nowhere free 
trade policies were overturned during the last decade15 though there is no evidence that the low average 
tariff rates continued generating un-equalizing effects during the last decade (Székely, 2012). Yet, any 
additional liberalization must consider both its growth and inequality impact and foreclose any further 
opening if the expected results appear negative or uncertain. In addition, policy should actively promote 
13 In many developing countries, the accumulation of reserves was facilitated by gains in terms of trade, as the world 
prices of primary commodities rose and those of manufactures fell.
14 This approach may not fit the distributive objectives of countries where the poor work in the non-traded sector, the 
traded sector is skilled labour intensive – as in most mining economies – or the poor are located in the traded sector but 
structural factors reduce the pass-through of the benefits of devaluation. In very small economies with volatile terms of 
trade and difficulties in diversifying exports, dollarization may be preferable. Finally, in large developing economies with 
comparatively low trade/GDP ratios, a competitive real exchange rate is just one of the possible viable options, as growth 
and distributive goals can also be pursued through an expansion of domestic demand driven by fiscal policy.
15 Yet, in 2011 Argentina and Brazil (whose real exchange rates are appreciating due to mounting inflows) raised tariff 
rates to 35 per cent, the maximum allowed by WTO rules when domestic industry is threatened by excess imports.
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trade diversification by sector and destination (see section III.A on Latin America and III.B on South-
East Asia) so as to limit the potential contagion of dominant trade partners, as observed in EE-FSU in 
2008–2010. In brief, there should be a drive towards a trade liberalization that avoids a collapse of the 
import competing sectors, actively seeks to diversify the composition and destination of exports, while 
quickly removing any remaining anti-export bias and promoting regional trade integration, especially 
in manufacturing. Finally, whenever trade liberalization promotes growth (e.g. via technological 
modernization) but raises simultaneously inequality (e.g. by making redundant unskilled workers), it 
must then be accompanied by compensatory programmes and active labour market policies to reduce 
the impact on wage inequality (see later).
- Countercyclical fiscal policy and stabilization funds: in many countries, government revenue and deficits 
swing widely because of fluctuations in the demand and prices of their exports. Capital markets behave 
pro-cyclically and are therefore unable in stabilizing consumption. All this has traditionally led to IMF-
recommended public expenditure cuts that exacerbate the shocks and worsen growth and inequality. 
However, as the recent experience of a few Latin American and some South-East Asian countries shows, 
these problems can be tackled with countercyclical policies which expand public expenditure and cut 
interest rates in crisis years (as in 2009) and realize budget surpluses, reduce public debt, accumulate 
reserves and cut inflation during boom years. In commodity exporters, countercyclical fiscal policies can 
be helped by the creation of ‘stabilization funds’ which set aside resources during periods of bonanza 
and release them in crisis years, as in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Chile. During the boom 
years, such policy reduces the inflationary pressures arising from the non-traded sector, while during 
crises, it sustains public consumption and aggregate demand. An alternative solution consists in the 
ex-ante adoption of ‘contingency fiscal rules’ (as introduced recently in Latin America) that establish 
that, in case of unanticipated shocks, governments are not bound by the usual fiscal targets and are free 
to raise public expenditure and budget deficit. Such measures provide credibility to an expansionary 
fiscal stance in countries where similar discretionary measures are looked upon with suspicion by the 
markets and the IMF.
 A key policy issue concerns the choice of a sustainable deficit under crisis situation and the pace of its 
reduction. In this regard, there is evidence that large and rapid fiscal cuts reduce growth over the short 
and long-term. While deficits do need to be reduced, this should be done gradually. As suggested by 
Adam and Bevan (2001), deficit reductions of up to 1.5 per cent of GDP per year help re-establish fiscal 
balance with a minimal impact on output, but larger reductions actually hurt growth.16 The allocation 
of budget cuts also has a major impact on income inequality. In this regard, recent evidence shows that 
– unlike in the 1980s and 1990s – in 2009, the IMF recommended to protect or expand spending on 
health, education, public works, income support, infrastructure and key public investments (Ortiz et al., 
2010), though this stance was abandoned in 2010. The last decade has also seen the massive diffusion 
of strongly equalizing targeted cash transfer programmes as in Brazil, Malaysia (section III.B) and 
Thailand (table 7) as well as non-contributory social pensions in Southern Africa and India’s National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. Such programmes are now found in at least 18 countries in 
Latin America, 20 in SSA, 6 in South Asia and 5 in South-East Asia and cover 860 million people 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1672090). While these transfers are not usually 
considered a component of macro-policy, they have come to play the role of ‘automatic stabilizers’ 
similar to that played by unemployment insurance in the OECD. This makes it possible to introduce 
macro policies that otherwise would generate hard-to-shoulder social and political costs.
- Increased taxation to reduce budget deficits and improve macro stability: in many developing countries, 
the budget deficits recorded in the 1980s and 1990s resulted not so much (or not only) from excessive 
16 The IMF position changed in 2009, as it now plays a role close to that of lender of last resort, largely along the lines 
demanded by developing countries. It is plausible that in 2008–2009 its action helped avoid severe crises in small economies 
suffering from financial and external fragility.
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public expenditures, but mainly from low and falling tax/GDP ratios (Chu et al., 2004) which often led 
to costly fiscal adjustments or to cuts in social provisions with un-equalizing effects (see section III.D 
on China). Indeed, as argued by Singh (2006) the macroeconomic fragility of the 1980s and 1990s in 
several developing countries was due to their low tax collection. As argued in section III.A this has 
changed in over half of the countries of Latin America, the Republic of Korea and other regions, though 
it is worsened in countries of EE-FSU following the implementation of tax reforms during the 2000s 
(table 8). Latin America witnessed during the last decade (in some cases starting during the late 1990s) 
a fairly universal and progressive rise in tax/GDP ratio (which rose by a staggering 9–10 points in Brazil 
and Argentina) and which improved perceptibly the distribution of after-tax income, a phenomenon 
observed also in the Republic of Korea (table 6). Yet, this was not the case until very recently in several 
developing countries including China where the effective tax collection remained below the potential 
(Cornia, Gomez Sabaini and Martorano, 2011).
- A countercyclical and accommodating monetary policy: the liberal stance has traditionally aimed at 
single digit inflation by means of raises in interest rates and credit restrictions. Yet, Bruno and Easterly 
(1998) have shown that driving inflation below 40 per cent per year produces no discernible economic 
benefits, while our results (table 13) show that price increases above such threshold do affect the 
growth of GDP. In turn, rapid disinflation is likely to cause a contraction in GDP and – because of the 
endogeneity of tax revenue to GDP – a widening of the fiscal deficit. Furthermore, a policy of high 
interest rates increases the concentration of financial wealth in the hands of bond holders and raises 
production costs, the financial charges borne by firms and cost-push inflation. In view of all this, 
monetary policy should aim at a more gradual decline of inflation which, after the rapid disinflation of 
the 1990s, is in any case smaller than in the past. This means that while real interest rate may aim at the 
2–3 per cent range, nominal rates ought to increase less markedly than in the standard approach. This 
policy should help contain cost-push inflation and at the same time avoid a contraction in investment 
and employment. While the money supply compatible with this approach needs to be accommodating, 
the policy maker should simultaneously introduce microeconomic reforms to deal with the causes of 
cost-push inflation. At the same time, the experience of the last decade (see section III.A) suggests that 
monetary policy should be actively used in a countercyclical way so as to contain the impact of crises 
and for the sterilization of changes in the foreign exchange market. In extreme cases, capital controls 
are necessary to preserve monetary autonomy.
- Banking and financial sector regulation: inequality can also be reduced by measures to regulate the 
domestic financial sector similar to those adopted in some developing regions during the last decade 
– as confirmed also by our econometric analysis (table 13, model 3). Indeed, a remarkable feature of 
the last decade is that – after the early 2000s crises in Turkey, Argentina, Uruguay and Ecuador (Halac 
and Smuckler, 2003) – there were fewer significant financial crises, including during the 2007–2010 
global crisis. One of the reasons for this crisis avoidance was the broader role played by the IMF since 
2008 in lending greater amounts of resources with easier access and lower conditionality. This shift 
allowed the financing of 19 stand-by programmes (mostly to EE-FSU countries) between July 2008 
and November 2009. But improvements in banking regulation and financial oversight were also behind 
the greater financial stability of several developing countries, including in Latin America (Porzekanski, 
2009; Rojas Suarez, 2010). These authors have argued that – in addition to the improvement in the field 
of macroeconomics – most Latin American governments reduced currency mismatches, enhanced the 
capitalization, funding and supervision of their banking systems, encouraged the development of local 
capital markets, introduced a stricter prudential regulation of their domestic financial system and of 
lending, enhanced risk-assessment mechanisms in large banks, created appropriate legal, judicial and 
accounting frameworks, while assigning to state banks a greater role in the mobilization of domestic 
savings and the financing of economic activity.
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2. An ‘open economy industrial policy’
Sustainable long-term growth and an acceptable level of inequality require also a steady evolution in the 
structure of production, export and imports of a country. Historically, such objective was achieved by 
means of a ‘closed economy industrial policy’ which protected for years the infant industry by means 
of tariffs, subsidies and public investments. This approach is now foreclosed to practically all countries 
by participation in the WTO and other institutions though as noted in footnote 16 tariff and non-tariff 
protection is now on the rise in Latin America (possibly due to the inability to fully control the real 
exchange rate). However, during the last decade Australia, China, Chile, Finland, Ireland, Malaysia, the 
Republic of Korea, Singapore and Viet Nam showed that it is possible to develop an ‘open economy 
industrial policy’, diversify output and exports and raise the knowledge content of production, thanks to 
proactive macroeconomic and industrial policies, both economy-wide and sector specific. A first powerful 
way to diversify output is to adopt a stable and competitive exchange rate which appears to have a greater 
protective effects on the import-competing domestic manufacturing sector than tariff rates of 30 per 
cent or so (Helleiner, 2011), though this may require the introduction of drastic capital controls. Small 
developing countries may in contrast choose to rely on selected-FDI as a vehicle of industrial policy, while 
making sure to “crowd-in” domestic investments and do not displace workers in the traditional sector. 
A third approach, such as that followed in Chile, is of microeconomic nature. The country diversified 
its export basket towards resource-based products (wood, fresh-fruit, wine, salmon) by generating high 
levels of public knowledge, R&D and infrastructure – by means of a strong long-term alliance between 
the public and private sectors.
3. Labour market, public expenditure and social protection policies
These measures may be introduced to offset the adverse distributive effects of macro measures which 
may be desirable in terms of growth but not of income inequality. In addition, some of these policies have 
been shown in section III to stimulate growth while reducing the un-equalizing effect of some measures.
- Labour market policies: econometric evidence for Latin America (Cornia, 2012; Keifman and Maurizio, 
2012) shows that efforts aiming at strengthening labour institutions – which regulate the distribution 
of earnings by addressing the problems of unemployment, job informalization, minimum wages and 
weak institutions for wage negotiations and dispute settlements – reduced income inequality. Specific 
programmes in this area include passive and active labour market policies, such as unemployment 
insurance, retraining programmes and self-targeting public-work schemes. Minimum wages – which 
reduce earnings inequality in most cases – can also be raised moderately without causing efficiency 
costs. Finally, wage bargaining institutions, which have been weakened substantially in most countries 
during the last three decades need to be strengthened. Efforts at ‘formalizing employment’, if at the 
cost of greater employment flexibility, may also be needed. Lack of data prevented us from introducing 
such variables in regression analysis in table 13.
- Progressive taxation: income inequality can also be reduced through tax reforms which, in addition to 
strengthening budgetary balance (see above), aim at greater after – tax equity and redistribution (Cornia, 
Gomez-Sabaini and Martorano, 2011). As noted in section III.A, in Latin America about half of the three 
point average increase in the tax/GDP ratio was generated by the income tax, presumptive taxation, 
financial transaction taxes, consumption taxes on luxury items, a reduction of dis-equalizing excises on 
oil, alcoholic beverages and tobacco. As a result, between the 1990s and 2000s the Reynolds–Smolensky 
index (which measures the redistributive effect of taxation) improved by between 0.6 and 3.8 Gini points 
in ten countries out of the 11 with available data (ibid.). Even stronger effects of taxation were evident 
in the Republic of Korea (table 6). In contrast, in the European transition economies, the adoption of a 
flat tax on personal and corporate income (table 8) likely generated an un-equalizing impact on post-
tax income distribution in several countries, while spatial inequality rose in China due to the weakness 
of the tax and transfer reforms of the early 1980s and 1994 (section III.D). Though the tax/GDP ratio 
increased in many developing regions during the last decade (ibid.), there still is considerable room 
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to improve the vertical and horizontal equity of taxation. This can be done not only with traditional 
progressive income and wealth taxes but also with a sufficiently high flat-tax rates and a sizeable no 
tax area, progressive indirect taxes and an appropriate taxation of mining rents and windfall profits.
- Public social expenditure and educational investment: an adequate level of taxation permits also to 
supply in non inflationary way essential public goods, carry out progressive social transfers and finance 
compensatory programmes to offset the adverse effects of efficient but un-equalizing macro policies. 
As noted in section III, several countries of Latin America and South-East Asia increased in recent 
times public expenditure on education, while the transition economies of Central Europe (but not 
those of the former Soviet Union, the Balkans and – until recently – China) preserved the high level of 
public expenditure on education/GDP inherited from the socialist era. As noted in all four regional case 
studies analysed, an improvement in the distribution of educational achievements among the members 
of the workforce has a strong impact on the distribution of wages, as it increases the supply of skilled 
and semi-skilled workers (the ‘quantity effect’) and reduces the rise of the skill premium (the ‘price 
effect’). In many middle income developing countries, this means expanding enrolment and completion 
rates in secondary education and broadening the access to subsidized tertiary education. The effects 
on inequality are lagged by 5–10 years but tend to be powerful. Of course, the inequality impact of an 
increased supply of skilled labour is not automatic, as an increase in employment and drop in wage 
inequality can come about only if additional jobs are created.
- Income transfers: they can generate strong redistributive effects, though their composition is crucial 
and though such programmes are often introduced to offset the dis-equalizing impact of restrictive 
macroeconomic policies, as observed for Central Europe and a few Latin American countries. While 
steadily rising (Brazil, Malaysia, Mexico and Thailand are good examples of such approach), such 
public transfers are still often smaller than desirable. Their intensification can be effected through 
social insurance and social assistance schemes. In this regard, the recent evidence suggests that the 
best approach may consist in ‘walking on two legs’. In a country with a limited formal sector, social 
insurance expenditure is little progressive or may even be regressive, as it mainly covers the few 
comparatively well-off formal sector workers. Focusing only on its expansion would thus be regressive. 
This suggests that while actively extending the formal sector social insurance, government may be 
setting up solidarity-based, non-contributory, universal or targeted funds providing basic benefits to 
informal sector workers and their families, including also conditional and non-conditional cash transfers. 
In middle income countries, both approaches should be pursued at once.
B. Tackling the structural causes of high inequality
In several countries, the policies illustrated above have succeeded in offsetting the rise in inequality induced 
by the crisis of the 1980s and liberal policies implemented to respond to it. But additional measures are 
needed to tackle the structural causes of high inequality. Though not part of the focus of this paper, such 
sectoral measures are briefly mentioned hereafter for sake of completeness. 
- Agrarian reforms: as noted in section III.D, the egalitarian redistribution of the land of the Chinese and 
Vietnamese communes and of state land in Malaysia had a very positive equity and growth effect. Some 
redistribution occurred also in a few economies in transition and a few other countries. In contrast, despite 
the persistence of a high land concentration, no agrarian reform took place in the rest of Asia and Latin 
America. Meanwhile, the number of potentially dis-equalizing ‘land grabs’ increased in countries with 
both high and low land-man ratios. Yet, in labour surplus countries, the redistribution of large farms, 
plantations and state-run farms to the landless, near-landless and smallholders can improve both equity 
and efficiency (Lipton, 2009). Indeed, with land reform the distribution of farm output improves while 
the wages of agricultural labourers rise, rural-urban migration falls and the urban reservation wage 
grows. Yet, despite the election of progressive regimes (and initial promises in this regard) there was 
no redistribution of land in Latin America, South-Asia and Southern Africa – and over one third of rural 
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households remain landless. Indeed, there is a danger that the social assistance transfers introduced on a 
growing scale in many countries during the last 10 years (see above) may reduce the pressure to redistribute 
land. If this is the case, other measures can been tried, including market and tax incentives to trigger a 
market-based redistribution of land (Binswanger and Deininger, 1997). At present, land taxes are low 
or non-existent in much of the developing world often due to the lack of good land records. Yet, large 
landowners often benefit disproportionately from public investment in rural infrastructure. Introducing 
progressive land taxes would reduce the net subsidy to large landowners. Since large farmers typically 
underuse their land – which can be sold to pay taxes – the output effect of well administered land taxes 
need not be large. Land released into the market can be purchased by community funds for the poor.
- Correct market failures, in particular in the credit and insurance markets: well designed bank and 
microcredit-based programmes can do much to raise the incomes of the poor (Mosley and Hulme, 1998). 
It is therefore necessary to develop a capillary network of financial institutions accessible to the poor in 
both rural and urban areas. This entails facilitating the establishment of easier-to-set-up-and-capitalize 
micro-credit schemes, savings associations, cooperative banks, credit-unions and to establish branches 
of commercial banks in marginal areas, as happened during the rapid development of the 19th century in 
Germany and Italy and more recently in Bangladesh where the famous Grameen bank and BRAC bank 
now reach millions of low-income users. Less attention has been given to insurance. The development 
of insurance markets for smallholders and micro-entrepreneurs would enable them to insure against 
household-specific and covariant shocks affecting the entire community. In poor countries, both types 
of formal insurance are unavailable to most people. Insurers are few, they possess imperfect information 
about risk and gathering more information is costly and unprofitable when average household income is 
low. Consequently, specific and covariant shocks result in distressed asset-sales and increased inequality.
- Contain ‘the curse of natural resources’: while natural resources, especially energy and metals, generate 
considerable wealth, they also cause problems of exchange rate volatility, Dutch disease, dependence 
on food imports, lack of structural diversification and – central to the topic of this paper – high income 
inequality. Measures which have been shown can address these problems include the sterilization of 
export proceeds that cannot be absorbed productively into the economy (and which would raise the 
exchange rate) in offshore sovereign funds for the benefit of future generations. Other measures concern 
the creation of fiscal stabilization funds (section V.A), as well as an adequate taxation of the resource 
sector (which often benefits from various exemptions), so as to finance the diversification of the economy 
and a reduction in income inequality via non-contributory income transfers to the poor (see section V.A).
- Improve the quality and incidence of social and infrastructural expenditure: the distribution of public 
spending in many countries is neither conducive to growth nor to lower inequality. The non-poor 
disproportionately benefit from public spending, their benefits far exceeding their taxes (van de Walle, 
1998). Refocusing public spending on the poor (on basic health care, primary education and safe water 
and sanitation) requires however better state capacity in addition to political will. In Uganda, only one 
third of every dollar spent on primary education reaches schools as a result of budgeting and planning 
problems, despite the government’s pro-poor commitment. The wealthy block reform and corrupt tax 
authorities and in doing so undermine support for taxation among middle and low income groups, who 
rightly perceive the tax system to be unfair – an effect that is very evident in EE-FSU (Pirttilä, 1999).
- Reduce regional and ethnic inequalities that cause poverty and social conflict: racial and ethnic bias has 
been prevalent in public spending and public employment. This has exacerbated horizontal inequality, 
leading to adverse growth effects through social conflict and localized violence. Large countries often 
combine a well developed modern sector with remote and very poor backward areas, often inhabited by 
people of a specific ethnic origin (as in Brazil’s North-East or Xinkiang in China). In Mexico, 80 per cent 
of the indigenous population is poor, while only 18 per cent of Caucasians are poor (Psacharopoulos and 
Patrinos, 1994). Malaysia (section III.B) is a good example of how such regional and ethnic inequality 
can be reduced while China (section III.D) has so far adopted policies which exacerbated both spatial 
and ethnic inequality.
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Table A.1
List of countries/economies used in regression analysis
Region Country/economy
OECD Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States
European transition economies Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Republic 
of Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
Asian transition economies Cambodia, China, Viet Nam
Latin America Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 
MENA Algeria, Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey
South East Asia Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan 
Province of China, Thailand
South Asia Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
Sub-Saharan Africa Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, 
Zambia
annex
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Table A.2
Description of the variables used in the regression analysis
Variable Description
Unit of 
measurement Data source
Gini coefficient of 
income inequality 
Gini coefficient of disposable 
income 
Index (0–100) SWIIDv3_0, IDLA database, EUROSTAT, 
World Development Indicators (WDI), African 
Development Bank database (AfDB), Asian 
Development Bank database (ADB), Economic 
and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific 
database (ESCAP) and national sources
International terms 
of trade index
International terms of trade, 
goods and services
Index, 2000=100 UNCTAD and WDI 
Remittances 
(per cent of GDP)
Workers’ remittances/GDP Share of GDP UNCTAD
FDI (per cent of 
GDP)
Net stock of Foreign Direct 
Investment/GDP
Share of GDP UNCTAD
GDP growth rate Growth rate of GDP per 
capita 
Rate of growth USDA/ERS - International Macroeconomic Data 
Set, 2011
Average years of 
education of the 
workforce
Number of years of 
education of adults (25+)
Absolute number Barro and Lee, 2010
Direct/indirect taxes Ratio of direct taxes on 
indirect taxes revenue
Ratio Asian Development Bank database 
(ADB), EUROSTAT, Government Finance 
Statistics(GFS), IDLA database, National 
sources, OECD stat, World Development 
Indicators (WDI), World Tax Database.
Social Protection 
(per cent of 
government 
expenditure)
Social Protection 
expenditure as percentage 
of government expenditure
Ratio Asian Development Bank database (ADB), 
Easterly (2010), EUROSTAT, Government 
Finance Statistics (GFS), IDLA database, 
national sources, OECD stat, World 
Development Indicators (WDI), World Tax 
Database
Real effective 
exchange rate index
Real effective exchange rate 
index
Index, 2005=100 Darvas Z, 2012
Bank deregulation 
index
Frazer Institute Index, 
varying between 0 (no 
deregulation) and 10 
(complete deregulation)
Index (0–10) Gwartney et al., 2011
Kaopen index of 
capital account 
openness
The Kaopen index is a 
positive function of the 
openness. 
By construction, 
the series has a 
mean of zero
Chinn and Ito, 2011.
Change of debt/
GDP ratio
Change of total public debt 
if the debt/GDP ratio is > 60 
per cent
Annual change 
of the ratio
The World Economic Outlook (WEO) database 
2011 and Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010
Investment rate  
(per cent of GDP)
Investment rate  
(per cent of GDP)
Percentage of 
GDP
The World Economic Outlook (WEO) database 
2011
Annual percentage 
change of inflation
Change of the inflation rate 
if inflation rate is > 40 per 
cent
Annual change 
of the ratio
World Development Indicators (WDI)
Currency Reserves/
GDP
International reserves as a 
share of GDP
Percentage of 
GDP
UNCTADstat, 2011
Annual change in 
Polity iv Index
Annual change of Index 
of democracy measuring 
the quality of democratic 
institutions
Annual change 
of the ratio
Polity IV project
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